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1. INTRODUCTION 
The United States-led War on Terror1 has reignited a fierce 
normative debate between advocates of the potentially competing 
interests of civil rights and national security.  On one hand, some 
argue that using the broadest measures available to capture and 
prosecute alleged terrorists around the world is either advisable or 
necessary in order to protect national security.2  Under this view, 
the interest in capturing and neutralizing potential threats to 
public safety outweighs the interest in protecting the civil and 
 
1 The terms “War on Terror” or “war on terrorism” are used in the 2002 U.S. 
National Security Strategy to define the current U.S.-led set of military campaigns 
relating to combating terrorism.  THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY 
STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Introduction, 27, 30, 31 (2002), available 
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2002/nss.pdf [hereinafter 2002 
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY].  As the term “War on Terror” is the most 
commonly used, this Comment will use that term throughout. 
2 See, e.g., Ashcroft Eager to Expand Police Powers, NEWSMAX.COM WIRES, Oct. 
26, 2001, http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2001/10/25 
/160238.shtml (quoting then Attorney General John Ashcroft: “Let the terrorists 
among us be warned . . . [w]e will seek every prosecutorial advantage.  We will 
use all our weapons within the law and under the Constitution to protect life and 
enhance security for America.”). 
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procedural rights of the accused.  On the other hand, some argue 
that prioritizing the accused’s civil rights throughout their capture 
and prosecution is both advisable and necessary in order to protect 
national security and values.3  Under this view, the interest in 
maintaining procedural integrity or legitimacy of the legal system 
in dangerous times outweighs the interest in a potentially 
overinclusive prosecutorial policy. 
This Comment takes the latter view with specific regard to the 
issue of the appropriate parameters of the mens rea requirements 
used to prosecute and convict accused terrorists, narrowly focusing 
on the doctrine of willful blindness.  Willful blindness4 as a concept 
has long been a part of U.S. criminal law as a valuable means to 
convict those accused of committing offenses requiring a mens rea 
of knowledge who deliberately act to avoid inculpatory 
knowledge.  Recently though, the willful blindness doctrine has 
grown dangerously overinclusive, resulting in a highly increased 
risk of convicting defendants who have not acted willfully.  Many 
thinkers have questioned logical inconsistencies in the current 
doctrine, and courts have struggled to formulate clear and proper 
jury instructions on willful blindness due to confusion over the 
doctrine’s proper scope.  Additionally, courts and scholars have 
increasingly criticized the doctrine’s tendency to convict 
defendants for mere negligence, or at worst, for mere guilt by 
association.  With most terror charges requiring a mens rea 
requirement of “knowledge” or “willfulness” (particularly 
 
3 See generally William W. Burke-White, Human Rights and National Security: 
The Strategic Correlation, 17 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 249, 280 (2004) (arguing that a 
reconceptualization of the relationship between human rights and national 
security, including adherence to procedural safeguards relating to human rights, 
may yield innumerous social, legal, and political benefits). 
4 “Willful blindness” is perhaps the most common term for the concept 
discussed in this Comment, and will be used throughout for the sake of 
consistency.  However, the same concept is alternatively referred to by numerous 
equivalent terms, such as “deliberate ignorance,” “deliberate blindness,” “willful 
(or wilful) ignorance,” or “conscious avoidance,” to name a few.  Some also refer 
to willful blindness jury instructions as “ostrich” instructions, for example, see 
United States v. Alston-Graves, 435 F.3d 331, 338 (D.C. Cir. 2006), or “Jewell 
instructions,” after the Ninth Circuit’s ruling approving such an instruction in 
United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1976).  These terms are used 
interchangeably by both courts and scholars.  For discussion of the multiplicity of 
terms used by courts and scholars for the willful blindness concept, see Thomas 
A. Hagemann & Joseph Grinstein, The Mythology of Aggregate Corporate Knowledge: 
A Deconstruction, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 210, 222 n.62 (1997) and Robin Charlow, 
Wilful Ignorance and Criminal Culpability, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1351, 1352 n.1, 1354 n.8 
(1992). 
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conspiracy charges, for example), the dangers of the doctrine of 
willful blindness become highly relevant.  These dangers are 
particularly acute when applied to the context of those accused of 
acts of international terrorism5 in U.S. courts and in military 
tribunals, where many defendants may face execution upon a 
guilty verdict. 
In short, this Comment argues that dangers posed by 
misconstruing and misapplying the willful blindness doctrine 
create a lurking problem of overinclusive prosecution.  These 
dangers have heightened significance in the context of those 
accused of acts of international terrorism, who may be subject to 
execution if convicted.  In light of this context, this Comment 
argues that a reexamination of the willful blindness doctrine is 
necessary to prevent its improper and overinclusive use.  This is 
not at all to say that prosecutions of accused terrorists should be 
limited in any way from ordinary prosecutions, or that any special 
protections should be afforded to such defendants beyond such 
ordinary paradigms.  Rather, the argument is premised more 
narrowly on the idea that sufficient legal avenues to convict terror 
suspects exist such that an overbroad construal of willful blindness 
is neither necessary nor advisable to effect such prosecutions.  
Thus, expressed most basically, this Comment contends that the 
willful blindness doctrine should not be misused to improperly 
convict defendants of crimes that they did not commit, yet flaws in 
the current doctrine create the potential for just that risk. 
This Comment maintains that legal, political, cultural, and 
foreign policy interests support a narrower construction of the 
willful blindness doctrine, and that such interests are heightened 
with regard to those accused of international terrorism.  This 
Comment further argues that reexamination and properly narrow 
application of the doctrine as a whole are small but necessary steps 
to improve the procedural integrity of the U.S. legal system, 
particularly the prosecutorial scheme for terror defendants.  
Regard for propriety in the legal structure and process—
 
5 The precise definition of acts of international terrorism is the subject of 
voluminous debate.  See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER L. BLAKESLEY, TERROR AND ANTI-
TERRORISM: A NORMATIVE AND PRACTICAL ASSESSMENT 19-43 (2006) (discussing 
national and international definitions of terrorism, and the need to arrive at a 
consensus); Thomas H. Mitchell, Defining the Problem, in DEMOCRATIC RESPONSES 
TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 9, 16 (David A. Charters ed., 1991) (discussing the 
quest for a proper definition of international terrorism, and settling on a 
generalized definition). 
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augmented by well-founded criticisms concerning the basis for, 
and misunderstanding of, the willful blindness doctrine as a 
whole—supports a careful reexamination of the use of the doctrine 
in light of its currently overbroad scope.6  Moreover, a 
reexamination and narrower tailoring of the willful blindness 
doctrine would be a small but valuable step toward improving the 
procedural integrity of the U.S. legal system, with regard to both 
the prosecution of terror detainees and U.S. criminal law as a 
whole.  This step may also contribute to legitimizing the U.S. 
government’s terror prosecutions in the eyes of the international 
community, which would be of significant political benefit to the 
United States.  In a larger sense, this benefit could serve the 
interests of the War on Terror, by promoting both civil rights and 
national security. 
The Comment proceeds as follows:  Section 2 discusses the 
context of the War on Terror by way of background, and the 
procedures used to prosecute and detain those accused of acts of 
international terrorism, including detainees.  This Section sets the 
stage for arguing that abrogating the mens rea requirements used 
to convict terror defendants by applying an overbroad view of 
willful blindness would undermine the legitimacy of such 
convictions, and potentially exacerbate existing domestic and 
international hostility toward the War on Terror’s means and ends.  
Section 3 analyzes the concept of willful blindness and the current 
doctrine, looking particularly at the relationship between willful 
blindness and knowledge to focus the reader’s understanding on 
the doctrine’s proper purpose.  Section 3 further examines willful 
blindness in domestic U.S. law and then discusses the superseding 
international criminal law doctrine of “joint criminal enterprise,” to 
illustrate how far the willful blindness doctrine can reach if 
unchecked.  Section 4 examines some criticisms of the current 
scope and improper applications of the willful blindness doctrine, 
including some suggested limitations that may help to properly 
confine it.  Section 5 argues for reexamining and reining in the 
willful blindness doctrine, specifically in the context of 
prosecutions of those accused of acts of international terrorism, 
while acknowledging competing policy interests and critical 
responses.  The Comment concludes that a reexamination of the 
willful blindness doctrine will be a small but valuable step toward 
 
6 See generally Public Citizen v. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 468 (1989) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (“When structure fails, liberty is always in peril.”). 
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increasing the procedural legitimacy of U.S. terror prosecutions, 
thus improving the integrity of the U.S. legal system while 
promoting significant foreign policy interests. 
2. THE WAR ON TERROR 
To understand why an overinclusive willful blindness doctrine 
poses special dangers to those accused of international terrorism, it 
is necessary to examine the context of the U.S.-led War on Terror.  
By way of background, this Section discusses some of the most 
salient (and criticized) aspects of the U.S. terror prosecution 
scheme.  This background of existing erosions in terror defendants’ 
and detainees’ legal procedural protections suggests that improper 
use of the willful blindness doctrine poses a unique risk of 
contributing to or exacerbating such problems.  Similarly, a 
discussion of the domestic and international community’s 
generally hostile response to such erosions helps to introduce some 
of the foreign policy issues at stake.  Together, this background 
serves to bring the roots and scope of the problem into focus for 
the specific discussion of willful blindness later in this Comment. 
To clarify, this Section is not intended to serve as a partisan 
political diatribe, or to endorse any particular political view.  The 
purpose instead is to outline some of the domestic and 
international criticisms that the United States has incurred as a 
result of the policies and procedures undertaken in the War on 
Terror.  The Section particularly focuses on those related to 
perceived failures in legal procedural fairness.  This focus on 
criticism of the war is not intended to be political in nature, but 
rather to highlight the kinds of procedural improprieties—both 
actual and perceived—that, if reformed, could improve the 
perceived legitimacy of U.S. terror prosecutions.  Specifically, this 
Comment, in examining the dangers of misuse and misapplication 
of the willful blindness doctrine, argues that improving and fairly 
applying the willful blindness doctrine where it ought to be 
applicable (rather than applying it over-broadly) will be a small 
but useful step in responding to such criticism.  Doing so, it argues, 
would accordingly be a small but useful step in reforming the 
actual and perceived procedural integrity of the United States legal 
scheme for prosecuting those accused of international terrorism. 
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2.1. 9/11 as a Catalyst for Change in Policy 
The international community scrambled to address the threats 
posed by international terrorism following the attacks of 
September 11, 2001.7  For the United States in particular, the attacks 
served as a catalyst for an abrupt and dramatic change in domestic 
and foreign policy.8  One of the principal elements of this change 
was a new policy of proactive enforcement9 and preemption,10 
commonly referred to as the War on Terror.11  Beyond a distinctly 
proactive military strategy,12 the policy shift also manifested itself 
in a broad range of social and adjudicative mechanisms to address 
threats posed by international terrorism.  These controversial latter 
mechanisms13 are the most relevant to this discussion; specifically, 
 
7 See J. Craig Barker, The Politics of International Law-Making: Constructing 
Security in Response to Global Terrorism, 3 J. INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 5, 5 (2007) 
(characterizing the international community’s response to the problem of global 
terrorism as an “apparent rush to law”). 
8 See 2002 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 1, at 28 (“The events of 
September 11, 2001, fundamentally changed the context for relations between the 
United States and other main centers of global power, and opened vast, new 
opportunities.”). 
9 Id. at Introduction (“To defeat this threat we must make use of every tool in 
our arsenal—military power, better homeland defenses, law enforcement, 
intelligence, and vigorous efforts to cut off terrorist financing. . . .  [A]s a matter of 
common sense and self-defense, America will act against such emerging threats 
before they are fully formed.  We cannot defend America and our friends by 
hoping for the best. . . .  In the new world we have entered, the only path to peace 
and security is the path of action.”). 
10 Id. at 15 (“To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the 
United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.”). 
11 Some have questioned the propriety of defining such a conflict as one of 
“war.”  See Brien Hallett, Dishonest Crimes, Dishonest Language: An Argument about 
Terrorism, in UNDERSTANDING TERRORISM: PSYCHOLOGICAL ROOTS, CONSEQUENCES, 
AND INTERVENTIONS 49, 56 (Fathali M. Moghaddam & Anthony J. Marsella eds., 
2004) (“The problem is that terrorists are not waging a ‘war’; they are committing 
crimes. . . .  [I]f ‘war’ is the positive image of ‘political violence,’ then terrorism is 
its negative image.”). 
12 2002 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 8, at 29 (“The major 
institutions of American national security were designed in a different era to meet 
different requirements.  All of them must be transformed.  It is time to reaffirm 
the essential role of American military strength.”). 
13 While criticism of the breadth of such a preemptive approach to foreign 
policy relating to international terrorism has proliferated, some prominent 
defense lawyers have indicated a limited ideological support of such a strategy, 
finding it necessary to combat the terrorist threat effectively.  See ALAN M. 
DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS: UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT, RESPONDING TO 
THE CHALLENGE 27 (2002) (“An act of terrorism should be the occasion only for 
punishment and incapacitation, not for negotiation and consideration of root 
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the means by which those suspected of acts of international 
terrorism have been arrested, detained, and prosecuted. 
2.2. Detainment Centers and Extraordinary Rendition 
The use of detainment centers has been one controversial 
aspect of the U.S. strategy in prosecuting terror suspects.  These 
detainment centers have been severely criticized on numerous 
grounds, including for reportedly limiting detainees’ access to 
legal counsel and limiting their ability to confront evidence against 
them.14  Additionally, prisoner abuses at detainment centers such 
as Abu Ghraib15 have been the subject of extensive media coverage, 
resulting in increased public disapproval of U.S. approaches to 
terror prosecution.16  Such abuses have also resulted in strong 
rebukes from human rights advocacy organizations.17  In addition, 
 
causes.  The message must be that nothing will be gained by terrorism, and much 
will be lost. . . .  This would seem an obvious and simple first principle in dealing 
with terrorism . . . . [However,] the international community has responded in 
precisely the opposite manner.”). 
14 See William Glaberson, Court Tells U.S. to Reveal Data on Guantánamo, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 21, 2007, at A1 (“Advocates for detainees have criticized the tribunals 
since they were instituted in 2004 because the terror suspects held at Guantanamo 
have not been permitted lawyers during the proceedings and have not been 
allowed to see much of the evidence against them.”). 
15 See Torture in Abu Ghraib, in THE PHENOMENON OF TORTURE: READINGS AND 
COMMENTARY 60, 60–62 (William F. Schultz, ed. 2007) (providing a sworn 
statement from an Abu Ghraib detainee which details extensive physical, 
psychological and sexual abuse at the hands of U.S. interrogators). 
16 See H. L. POHLMAN, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION 117 (2008) 
(describing television reports of abuses of Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib 
broadcasting graphic photos, noting, “The parade of depressing photos 
contributed to the declining popular support for the Iraq war.  [President] Bush’s 
job approval rating dropped to 46 percent—the lowest up to that point in time.”) 
(citations omitted); Amos N. Guiora & Erin M. Page, The Unholy Trinity: 
Intelligence, Interrogation and Torture, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 427, 427 (2006) 
(“The greatest contemporary challenge faced by liberal democratic societies in 
confronting terrorism is the dilemma of balancing the legitimate national security 
interests of the State and the civil liberties of the individual.  Perhaps no issue 
represents that tension more than the dilemma faced by democratic societies 
about how to conduct interrogation of suspected terrorists in custody.  Accounts 
of abuses that have occurred at Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo Bay, and Bagram have 
served to bring the balancing issue to the forefront of the debate of how the 
United States . . . reacts to terrorism.”). 
17 See World Org. for Human Rights USA, Update to the 87th Session of the 
United Nations Human Rights Committee (June 15, 2006), 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/ngos/ICCPR_shadow_report
.pdf (outlining concerns regarding torture, extraordinary rendition, indefinite 
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the secrecy surrounding detainment centers such as those in 
Guantanamo Bay have incurred similar suspicion and criticism.18  
Others have claimed that mistreatment of detainees in U.S. custody 
may violate the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.19 
In response to this international criticism, some U.S. officials 
have argued that protections enumerated in the Geneva 
Conventions20 do not apply to detainees who are deemed to be 
unlawful enemy combatants.21  While this argument has been 
weakened both by scholars22 and recent Supreme Court holdings,23 
it has persisted.24 
 
detention and claims of exemption from human rights standards by the U.S. 
government with regard to treatment of detainees). 
18 See Mark Denbeaux & Joshua Denbeaux, Report on Guantanamo Detainees: A 
Profile of 517 Detainees through Analysis of Department of Defense Data (Seton Hall 
Public Law Research Paper No. 46, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com 
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=885659 (analyzing declassified information about 
detainees at Guantanamo). 
19 See, e.g., Torture and Inhumane Treatment: A Deliberate U.S. Policy, HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT, Jan. 2006, http://www.hrw.org/wr2k6 
/introduction/2.htm.  For the text of the Convention itself, see Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment art. 2, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, June 26, 1987, available at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/pdf/cat.pdf, prohibits torture and 
obligates state signatories to take various measures to ensure compliance.  Office 
of the High Commission for Human Rights, Declarations and Reservations (Apr. 
23, 2004), For the U.S. reservations to that Convention, see http://www.unhchr.ch 
/html/menu2/6/cat/treaties/convention-reserv.htm which limits the Senate’s 
advice and consent to ratification of the Convention and specifies particular 
understandings of relevant terminology. 
20 Specifically, this refers to rights provided by the Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, and the 
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516. 
21 Remarks by Vice President Dick Cheney to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
(Nov. 14, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/vicepresident       
/news-speeches/speeches/vp20011114-1.html (“The basic proposition here is that 
somebody who comes into the United States of America illegally, who conducts a 
terrorist operation killing thousands of innocent Americans, men, women, and 
children, is not a lawful combatant.  They don’t deserve to be treated as a prisoner 
of war.  They don’t deserve the same guarantees and safeguards that would be 
used for an American citizen going through the normal judicial process. . . .  
[T]hey will have a fair trial, but it’ll be under the procedures of a military tribunal 
and rules and regulations to be established in connection with that.  We think it’s 
the appropriate way to go.”) [hereinafter Cheney remarks]. 
22 See BLAKESLEY, supra note 5, at 231 (“Today, common Article 3 to the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 provides minimum protections for all persons 
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Additionally, vociferous critique has centered on the practice of 
extraordinary rendition—where suspected terrorists have been 
taken overseas and allegedly tortured—in CIA “black sites.”25  
Such foreign locations—the identities of which have been withheld 
from the public, as well as many members of both U.S. and foreign 
host governments26—are reportedly used for indefinite detention 
to obtain information from alleged terrorists beyond the scrutiny of 
U.S. law.27  These practices, instituted shortly after the September 
11, 2001 attacks,28 have incurred the ire of domestic and 
 
captured in any armed conflict.  These protections include basic due process 
guarantees.”) (citations omitted). 
23 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (holding that military 
commissions at Guantanamo Bay violated Common Article 3 of the Third Geneva 
Convention, while noting that the legislature may be able to grant the executive 
branch power statutorily to use military commissions under domestic law). 
24 See Stuart Taylor Jr., Overplaying Its Hand, NEWSWEEK, June 23, 2008, 
available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/141509 (“[A]fter 9/11, hard-liners in 
the administration decided that terror suspects brought to Guantánamo and 
various secret prisons around the world lacked any of the protections of the 
Geneva accords because they were ‘unlawful combatants.’”). 
25 See Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons, WASH. POST, 
Nov. 2, 2005, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn 
/content/article/2005/11/01/AR2005110101644.html (drawing attention to so-
called CIA “black sites” referenced in a variety of executive branch classified 
documents, as well as offering an overview of the way these locations are used). 
26 Id. (“The hidden global internment network is a central element in the 
CIA’s unconventional war on terrorism.  It depends on the cooperation of foreign 
intelligence services, and on keeping even basic information about the system 
secret from the public, foreign officials and nearly all members of Congress 
charged with overseeing the CIA’s covert actions.  The existence and locations of 
the facilities—referred to as ‘black sites’ in classified White House, CIA, Justice 
Department and congressional documents—are known to only a handful of 
officials in the United States and, usually, only to the president and a few top 
intelligence officers in each host country. . . . The Washington Post is not 
publishing the names of the Eastern European countries involved in the covert 
program, at the request of senior U.S. officials.  They argued that the disclosure 
might disrupt counterterrorism efforts in those countries and elsewhere and could 
make them targets of possible terrorist retaliation.”). 
27 Id. (“Although the CIA will not acknowledge details of its system, 
intelligence officials defend the agency’s approach, arguing that the successful 
defense of the country requires that the agency be empowered to hold and 
interrogate suspected terrorists for as long as necessary and without restrictions 
imposed by the U.S. legal system or even by the military tribunals established for 
prisoners held at Guantanamo Bay.”). 
28 Id. (“The secret detention system was conceived in the chaotic and anxious 
first months after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, when the working assumption was 
that a second strike was imminent.”). 
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international authorities, in addition to human rights advocates.29  
The practices have also been the subject of foreign indictments of 
CIA operatives.30  While these practices have been defended by the 
CIA as essential information gathering tools,31 their moral and 
legal legitimacy reportedly have also been internally hotly debated 
according to reports.32 
In sum, concerns over the procedural mechanisms used to 
prosecute terror defendants, particularly Guantanamo detainees, 
are particularly acute in light of the such defendants’ uniquely 
compromised situation as previously described.  Moreover, 
because the willful blindness doctrine requires a mens rea of 
knowledge—as do most charges against those accused of acts of 
international terrorism—the propriety of its use and application is 
of paramount importance in the context of that debate. 
2.3. Military Commissions 
Trials for those accused of acts of international terrorism in the 
current War on Terror may be conducted in specialized tribunals 
known as military commissions.33  Military commissions have a 
 
29 Id. (“[R]evelations of widespread prisoner abuse in Afghanistan and Iraq 
by the U.S. military—which operates under published rules and transparent 
oversight of Congress—have increased concern among lawmakers, foreign 
governments and human rights groups about the opaque CIA system.”). 
30 See Devika Bhat et al., Italian Judge Orders First ‘Rendition’ Trial of CIA 
Agents, TIMES ONLINE, Feb. 16, 2007, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news 
/world/europe/article1395637.ece (describing the first criminal court case 
regarding extraordinary rendition, indicting twenty-six Americans and five 
Italians over the abduction of Abu Omar in Milan and his alleged torture in 
Egypt). 
31 Priest, supra note 25 (“Although the CIA will not acknowledge details of its 
system, intelligence officials defend the agency’s approach, arguing that the 
successful defense of the country requires that the agency be empowered to hold 
and interrogate suspected terrorists for as long as necessary and without 
restrictions imposed by the U.S. legal system or even by the military tribunals 
established for prisoners held at Guantanamo Bay.”). 
32 Id. (“Since then, the arrangement has been increasingly debated within the 
CIA, where considerable concern lingers about the legality, morality and 
practicality of holding even unrepentant terrorists in such isolation and secrecy, 
perhaps for the duration of their lives.  Mid-level and senior CIA officers began 
arguing two years ago that the system was unsustainable and diverted the agency 
from its unique espionage mission.”). 
33 See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 948b, 120 Stat. 
2600 (2006) [hereinafter MCA] (establishing “procedures governing the use of 
military commissions to try alien unlawful enemy combatants engaged in 
hostilities against the United States for violations of the law of war and other 
offenses triable by military commission”); William Glaberson, Portable Halls of 
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long history in United States law as a response to extraordinary 
national security threats such as war.34  In that context, their use 
has been deemed constitutional in certain limited circumstances.35  
These circumstances originally included situations where the 
defendant is connected with the military or is a prisoner of war; 
where the offense charged dealt with a violation of the law of war; 
where domestic courts were insufficient or inoperative; and where 
some governmental “necessity” could be demonstrated.36  
 
Justice Are Rising in Guantánamo, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2007, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/14/us/14gitmo.html?fta=y (“If and when 
the trials begin, they will be held under a set of rules created especially for trying 
terrorism suspects.  And now they will be held in a setting created especially for 
terrorism suspects.”). 
34 See, e.g., Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866) (discussing the use of a 
military tribunal to try a civilian U.S. citizen arrested in Indiana for planning to 
raid a federal arsenal and use the weapons obtained there to free Confederate 
prisoners); Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868); (dismissing an appeal 
from a trial by military commission of a civilian U.S. citizen for charges relating to 
publishing libelous news articles for lack of jurisdiction); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 
1, 18 (1942) (affirming conviction in trial by military commission for seven 
German nationals and a dual U.S.-German nationals accused of sabotage, 
espionage, and “violations of the law of war”). 
35 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 592–601 (2006) (finding that while the 
particular military commissions at Guantanamo Bay violated Common Article 3 
of the Geneva Conventions, Congress may grant the President power to use 
military commissions under domestic law). 
36 See, e.g., Milligan, 71 U.S. at  121–22 (“[Military commissions] can never be 
applied to citizens in states which have upheld the authority of the government, 
and where the courts are open and their process unobstructed.  This court has 
judicial knowledge that in Indiana the Federal authority was always unopposed, 
and its courts always open to hear criminal accusations and redress grievances; 
and no usage of war could sanction a military trial there for any offense whatever 
of a citizen in civil life, in nowise connected with the military service. . . .  Why 
was [Milligan] not delivered to the Circuit Court of Indiana to be proceeded 
against according to law?  No reason of necessity could be urged against it; 
because Congress had declared penalties against the offences charged, provided 
for their punishment, and directed that court to hear and determine them.  And 
soon after this military tribunal was ended, the Circuit Court met, peacefully 
transacted its business, and adjourned.  It needed no bayonets to protect it, and 
required no military aid to execute its judgments.  It was held in a state, eminently 
distinguished for patriotism, by judges commissioned during the Rebellion, who 
were provided with juries, upright, intelligent, and selected by a marshal 
appointed by the President.  The government had no right to conclude that 
Milligan, if guilty, would not receive in that court merited punishment . . . .”); 
Quirin, 317 U.S. at 29 (“Congress has authorized trial of offenses against the law of 
war before such commissions.  We are concerned only with the question whether 
it is within the constitutional power of the national government to place 
petitioners upon trial before a military commission for the offenses with which 
they are charged.  We must therefore first inquire whether any of the acts charged 
is an offense against the law of war cognizable before a military tribunal, and if so 
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Currently, while particular military commissions’ procedures have 
been deemed illegal domestically and internationally,37 use of 
military commissions in general has been authorized by 
legislation.38 
Charges brought in trials by military commissions deal with 
violations of the laws of war39 and other related matters.40  
However, many of the charges retain similarities to more 
 
whether the Constitution prohibits the trial. . . . [A]s we shall show, these 
petitioners were charged with an offense against the law of war which the 
Constitution does not require to be tried by jury.”). 
37 See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 634–35 (holding that military commissions at 
Guantanamo Bay violated Common Article 3 of the Third Geneva Convention 
and constitutional boundaries of Executive power); see generally id. at 641 (“If the 
military commission at issue is illegal under the law of war, then an offender 
cannot be tried ‘by the law of war’ before that commission.”). 
38 See MCA, supra note 33 (authorizing the use of military commissions to try 
unlawful enemy combatants); Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-
148, § 1005 (2005) (establishing procedural requirements for Combatant Status 
Review Tribunals (“CSRTs”)); see also Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 636 (2006) (“The 
dissenters say that today’s decision would ‘sorely hamper the President’s ability 
to confront and defeat a new and deadly enemy.’  They suggest that it 
undermines our Nation’s ability to ‘preven[t] future attacks’ of the grievous sort 
that we have already suffered.  That claim leads me to state briefly what I believe 
the majority sets forth both explicitly and implicitly at greater length.  The Court’s 
conclusion ultimately rests upon a single ground: Congress has not issued the 
Executive a ‘blank check.’  Indeed, Congress has denied the President the 
legislative authority to create military commissions of the kind at issue here.  
Nothing prevents the President from returning to Congress to seek the authority 
he believes necessary.” (internal citations omitted)). 
39 See JENNIFER ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., TERRORISM AND THE LAW OF 
WAR: TRYING TERRORISTS AS WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE MILITARY COMMISSIONS 1–2 
(Dec. 11, 2001) available at http://www.fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/ 
7951.pdf (discussing that classifying terrorist acts as violations of the international 
law of war rather than criminal acts permits trials by military commissions rather 
than in federal courts); see also William Glaberson, Court Advances Military Trials 
For Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2007, at A1, available at  
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/25/washington/25gitmo.html (indicating 
that as many as eighty detainees may eventually face war crimes charges 
according to chief prosecutor, Col. Morris D. Davis). 
40 See, e.g., Charge Sheet, United States v. Hamdan, (Apr. 6, 2007), available at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/May2007/Hamdan_Charges.pdf (charging 
Hamdan with conspiracy and providing material support for terrorism); Charge 
Sheet, United States v. Khadr (Apr. 6, 2007) [hereinafter Khadr Charge Sheet] 
available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2007/Khadrreferral.pdf 
(charging Omar Ahmed Khadr with “murder in violation of the law of war” 
amongst other charges); Charge Sheet, United States v. Jawad, (Apr. 6, 2007) 
available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Oct2007/Jawad%20Charge 
%20Sheet.pdf (charging Mohammed Jawad with “attempted murder in violation 
of the law of war” amongst other charges). 
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recognizable domestic charges, including, for example, murder 
and conspiracy allegations.41  Some of the most frequent current 
charges include conspiracy and material support for terrorism, 
both of which generally require a mens rea of knowledge, thus 
implicating the problems posed by overinclusive use of the willful 
blindness doctrine.42  Defendants convicted in military 
commissions for terror charges may include any range of 
sentences, including life imprisonment43 or execution.44 
Military commissions offer a level of efficiency to prosecutors 
that exceeds that of domestic courts.  In light of this function, the 
U.S. Department of Defense has touted the usefulness and 
practicality of employing military commissions rather than federal 
courts for trying terror cases.45  Some, however, have questioned 
the propriety of the military commissions’ approach to achieving 
justice,46 while others have criticized the choice to employ them in 
the current context of the War on Terror.47 
 
41 See, e.g., Khadr Charge Sheet, supra note 40. 
42 See, e.g., id. at 5–6 (charging that Khadr “knowingly committed overt acts” 
in furtherance of the conspiracy and “intentionally [provided] material or 
resources” to groups “known by the accused to be an organization that engages in 
terrorism”). 
43 E.g., Detainee Dragged to Gitmo War Crimes Court, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 
21, 2008, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/24758702/ (discussing life 
imprisonment as one possible sentence in tribunals). 
44 E.g., William Glaberson, U.S. Said to Seek Execution for 6 in Sept. 11 Case, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02 
/11/us/11gitmo.html?_r=1&hp=&adxnnl=1&oref=slogin&adxnnlx=1202742208   
-Y3V09jempSOnrvusn64lpw (discussing execution as a potential punishment) . 
45  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t. of Defense, Detainee Convicted of Terrorism Charge 
at Guantanamo Trial (Mar. 30, 2007), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/ 
releases/release.aspx?releaseid=10678 (announcing conviction of David Matthew 
Hicks for material support to terrorism, stating: “Military commissions provide a 
mechanism to serve justice to those accused of law of war violations while 
keeping the United States, friends and allies safe from those bent on carrying out 
attacks on civilian populations and coalition forces.”). 
46 See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 13, at 217 (“[T]he military approach to justice . . 
. . will encourage many Americans to view the military approach to trials—which 
favors efficiency and certainty over fairness and the resolution of doubts in favor 
of the accused—as the norm rather than the exception.  This must never be 
allowed to happen, if our liberties are to be preserved.”). 
47 See, e.g., BLAKESLEY, supra note 5, at 230–31 (referring to the current use of 
secret military commissions to try accused terrorists as a “sad prospect” and 
calling the Supreme Court’s decision in Quirin as “embarrassing”); RICHARD B. 
ZABEL & JAMES J. BENJAMIN, JR., HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: 
PROSECUTING TERRORISM CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 5 (2008), 
http://www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/080521-USLS-pursuit-justice.pdf 
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Much of the criticism regarding the current use of military 
commissions has centered on their procedural and substantive 
differences from regularly constituted American courts.48  
Procedurally, military commissions differ sharply from ordinary 
U.S. courts49 in numerous ways that some argue may compromise 
their legitimacy.50  For example, military commissions have 
endured criticism for the secrecy of their proceedings,51 on the 
 
(concluding that “contrary to the views of some critics, the [federal courts are] 
generally well-equipped to handle most terrorism cases”). 
48 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 
3(1)(d), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364 (prohibiting state parties 
from engaging in “the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions 
without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording 
all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized 
peoples”). 
 Whether the military commissions currently employed by the U.S. 
government qualify as regularly constituted courts—or, alternatively, whether 
they are required to comply with that requirement at all—has been the subject of 
debate.  However, several U.S. courts have indicated that military commissions 
are not to be considered traditional regularly constituted courts under the Geneva 
Conventions or the Constitution.  See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 630–32 
(2006) (discussing the unresolved questions regarding the “regularly constituted” 
requirements of Common Article 3, and finding that the military commissions at 
issue do not qualify); see also Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 39 (1942) (“[M]ilitary 
tribunals, which are not courts in the sense of the Judiciary Article, and which in 
the natural course of events are usually called upon to function under conditions 
precluding resort to such procedures.” (citations omitted)). 
 Congress attempted to resolve the question definitively by statute in 2006.  See 
MCA, supra note 33, § 948b(f) (“A military commission established under this 
chapter is a regularly constituted court, affording all the necessary ‘judicial 
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples’ for 
purposes of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.”).  However, the 
provision carries little to no weight as a matter of international law.  See Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 27, Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 
available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions 
/1_1_1969.pdf (“A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as 
justification for its failure to perform a treaty.”). 
49 See supra citations and discussion in note 48.  But see Glaberson, supra note 
39 (citing the United States Court of Military Commission Review’s opinion that 
Congress intended Guantanamo tribunals to apply usual procedures of military 
courts). 
50 See generally Allison M. Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: 
Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of 
International Criminal Law, 93 CAL. L. REV. 75, 97 (2005) (“[P]roceedings perceived 
as illegitimate are not likely to foster peace and reconciliation.”). 
51 See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 13, at 214 (“Another important check on 
governmental overreaching is trial by jury and open trials.  That check was 
substantially undercut by President George W. Bush’s authorization of military 
tribunals to try noncitizens suspected of ties to terrorism.”); see generally N.Y. 
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grounds that such secrecy may offend the constitution’s provisions 
regarding public trials.52  Military commissions also depart from 
the practices of ordinary courts in several other controversial ways, 
including that they: allow classes of evidence ordinarily deemed 
inadmissible;53 restrict the kinds of legal counsel available to an 
 
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 724 (1971) (Douglas J., concurring) 
(“Secrecy in government is fundamentally anti-democratic.”); John F. Kennedy, 
Address to the American Newspaper Publishers Association, (Apr. 27, 1961), 
reprinted in JOHN F. KENNEDY: IN HIS OWN WORDS 91 (Eric Freedman & Edward 
Hoffman eds., Kensington Publishing Corp 2005) (“The very word ‘secrecy’ is 
repugnant in a free and open society, and we are as a people inherently and 
historically opposed to secret societies, to secret oaths and to secret proceedings.  
We decided long ago that the dangers of excessive and unwarranted concealment 
of pertinent facts far outweighed the dangers which are cited to justify it.  Even 
today, there is little value in opposing the threat of a closed society by imitating its 
arbitrary restrictions.  Even today, there is little value in insuring the survival of 
our nation if our traditions do not survive with it.  And there is very grave danger 
that an announced need for increased security will be seized upon by those 
anxious to expand its meaning to the very limits of official censorship and 
concealment.  And no official of my administration, whether his rank is high or 
low, civilian or military, should interpret my words here tonight as an excuse to 
censor the news, to stifle dissent, to cover up our mistakes or to withhold from the 
press and the public the facts they deserve to know.”). 
 While measures have been suggested that would add transparency to these 
proceedings, such measures nonetheless allow for a degree of anonymity greatly 
exceeding that of regularly constituted U.S. courts.  See Glaberson, supra note 33 
(“One new feature for trials expected to involve classified evidence is a plexiglass 
window separating the small press and spectator gallery from the floor of the 
courtroom.  At the touch of a button, the military judge will be able to cut off the 
sound in the spectator section.”); see also Sara Moore, Defense Department Seeks 
Death Penalty for Six Guantanamo Detainees, AMERICAN FORCES PRESS SERVICE NEWS 
ARTICLES, Feb. 11, 2008, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news 
/newsarticle.aspx?id=48930 (stating that “the Defense Department will make the 
hearings as open as possible”). 
52 See United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 488 (4th Cir. 2004) (Gregory, 
J., concurring in part) (“The entire process is cloaked in secrecy, making it 
difficult, if not impossible, for the courts to ensure the provision of Moussaoui’s 
rights. . . .  Moussaoui has constitutional rights, not extended to the prosecution, 
that are implicated by this procedure [of permitting only redacted summaries of 
witness testimony to be entered by the government rather than allowing the 
defendant to confront and cross examine such witnesses directly]. . . .  [T]oday 
justice has taken a long stride backward.”). 
53 See, e.g., id. (describing the use of redacted witness statements against the 
accused without cross-examination); Kelli Arena & Carol Cratty, Lawyer Fears 9/11 
Mastermind Trial will be “Insanity”, CNN.COM,  Apr. 24, 2008, 
http://www.cnn.com/2008/CRIME/04/23/ksm.attorney/index.html (quoting a 
defense lawyer as arguing: “Even the greenest deputy sheriff or rookie police 
officer in Skunk Hollow County knows that if you rough up a defendant, 
anything he says after that is not going to be admitted into court . . . .  The officer 
might not like those rules, but he understands them and will abide by them. . . .  
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accused;54 abrogate confidentiality protections between the accused 
and his counsel;55 and severely limit defendants’ appellate rights.56  
 
We have created a system under the military commissions that says in essence, ‘if 
he was roughed up, but what he says still seems reliable, we’ll accept it any way.’ 
And that’s just wrong.”); Editorial, Restoring American Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 
2007, at A18 (criticizing the MCA for allowing “the introduction of evidence 
tainted by coercion” and permitting the creation of “kangaroo courts in 
Guantanamo Bay that declare prisoners enemy combatants without a real hearing 
or reliable evidence.”).  But see generally MCA, supra note 33, § 948r(b) (“A 
statement obtained by use of torture shall not be admissible in a military 
commission under this chapter, except against a person accused of torture as 
evidence that the statement was made.”). 
54 See MCA, supra note 33, § 948k(b) (providing qualification requirements for 
defense counsel, including requiring that any civilian counsel be “otherwise 
qualified to practice before the military commission pursuant to regulations 
prescribed by the Secretary of Defense.”).  If civilian counsel is not deemed 
“otherwise qualified,” (due to lack of security clearance, for example) the 
defendant may be represented by military counsel known as a judge advocate.  
MCA §§ 948k(b)(1), (c) (providing prerequisites for trial counsel, including judge 
advocates); see also Uniform Code of Military Justice [UCMJ], 10 U.S.C. § 801 art. 
1(13) (2006) available at http://www.jag.navy.mil/documents/UCMJ.pdf  
(indicating that qualified judge advocates must be an officer of a branch of the 
armed services). 
 Additionally, the defendant in a CSRT proceeding—which determines 
whether or not he will be classified as an enemy combatant in the military 
commission—often is not provided with traditional legal counsel at all, but rather 
with a “personal representative” who is a member of the prosecuting military.  See 
MARK DENBEAUX & JOSHUA DENBEAUX, NO-HEARING HEARINGS: CSRT: THE MODERN 
HABEAS CORPUS?  AN ANALYSIS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE GOVERNMENT’S 
COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW TRIBUNALS AT GUANTANAMO 4 (2006) available at 
http://law.shu.edu/news/final_no_hearing_hearings_report.pdf (“The detainees 
were denied any right to counsel.  Instead, they were assigned a ‘personal 
representative’ who advised each detainee that the personal representative was 
neither his lawyer nor his advocate, and that anything that the detainee said could 
be used against him.  In contrast to the absence of any legal representative for the 
detainee, the Tribunal was required to have at least one lawyer and the Recorder 
(Prosecutor) was recommended to be a lawyer.  The assigned role of the personal 
representative was to assist the detainee to present his case.  In practice, any 
assistance was extraordinarily limited.”). 
55 See Denbeaux & Denbeaux, supra note 54 at 15 (“At that initial meeting 
with each detainee, the personal representative had several tasks, including 
warning the detainee that the personal representative was not the detainee’s 
lawyer and that nothing discussed would be held in confidence [by saying]: ‘I am 
neither a lawyer nor your advocate, but have been given the responsibility of 
assisting your preparation for the hearing.  None of the information you provide me 
shall be held in confidence and I may be obligated to divulge it at the hearing. I am 
available to assist you in preparing an oral or written presentation to the Tribunal 
should you desire to do so.’” (citation omitted)). 
56 See MCA, supra note 33, § 950j(b) (stripping appellate rights for those tried 
by military commission); see generally In re Yamashita, 66 S. Ct. 340, 353 (1946) 
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Defendants, however, are permitted to challenge their detention in 
U.S. federal courts.57  In particular, the lack of evidentiary 
disclosure requirements in cases where the government cites 
classified national security interests58 has been a flashpoint of 
criticism.  Finally, some scholars have alleged that military 
commissions unjustly pursue guilt by association in a manner 
evocative of the oft-criticized international criminal liability theory 
of joint criminal enterprise (which is discussed below).59 
As a result of these erosions of defendants’ procedural 
protections, concerns have been raised regarding whether 
defendants are provided with an adequate opportunity for a fair 
trial before military commissions.60  Specifically, some have 
suggested that the use of military commissions and related aspects 
of the U.S. terror prosecution scheme may violate the U.S. 
Constitution or the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
 
(denying writ of habeas corpus for defendant Japanese general convicted of 
violations of the law of war in a trial by military commission). 
57 See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229, 2275–76 (2008) (finding § 7 of the 
Military Commissions Act unconstitutional, and affording habeas rights to 
detainees); see also Bill Mears, Justices: Gitmo Detainees Can Challenge Detention in 
U.S. Courts, CNN.COM, June 12, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/US/06/12/ 
scotus/index.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2008) (discussing the Boumediene ruling). 
58 See UCMJ, § 801 art. 1(15)–(16) (broadly defining “classified information” 
as “any information or material that has been determined by an official of the 
United States pursuant to law, an Executive order, or regulation to require 
protection against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national security” and 
defining “national security” as encompassing both “the national defense” and 
“foreign relations” of the United States); Mil. R. Evid. 505(a) (“Classified 
information is privileged from disclosure if disclosure would be detrimental to the 
national security.  As with other rules of privilege this rule applies to all stages of 
the proceedings.”); see also ACLU v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 493 F.3d 644, 650 n.2 (6th 
Cir. 2007) (discussing the “State Secrets Doctrine”). 
59 See Danner & Martinez, supra note 50, at 80 (“The military commissions 
instituted by the U.S. government to try suspected terrorists include both 
command responsibility and a liability theory that closely resembles joint criminal 
enterprise, and the first indictments of Guantanamo detainees implicitly rely on 
this joint criminal enterprise theory of liability.” (citation omitted)); see also infra 
Section 3.3. 
60 See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED RULES FOR MILITARY 
COMMISSIONS TRIALS, http://www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/07125-usls-hrf-rcm-
analysis.pdf (arguing that “key flaws” in the procedural and evidentiary systems 
used in military commissions undermine defendants’ right to a fair trial); see 
generally Detainee Dragged to Gitmo War Crimes Court, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 21, 
2008, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/24758702/ (describing a 
detainee “boycott” of the military commissions rooted in perceived inequities in 
trial procedures). 
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Rights.61  These procedural erosions create a risk of overinclusive 
convictions and executions, which are augmented by the 
overinclusive risks inherent in the present willful blindness 
doctrine. 
2.3.1.  Prosecutions of Detainees Accused of Planning the 9/11 
Attacks 
The U.S. government has recently sought to try several 
Guantanamo detainees for alleged involvement in planning the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.62  Many of the trials will likely 
be held by military commission.63  Some have criticized the 
decision to have the trials conducted by military commission rather 
than in domestic courts on the grounds discussed above, while 
others have suggested critiques on more naked political grounds.64  
Such criticism is amplified by the CIA’s admission that at least 
some of these defendants were subject to harsh interrogation 
methods such as waterboarding to obtain information which may 
be used against them at trial.65  The defendant detainees at such 
trials, if found guilty, would likely face execution.66 
 
61 See John Cerone, The Military Commissions Act of 2006: Examining the 
Relationship between the International Law of Armed Conflict and US Law, ASIL 
INSIGHTS, Nov. 13, 2006, available at http://www.asil.org/insights/2006 
/11/insights061114.html (arguing that the MCA may violate both constitutional 
law and international law, specifically Article 15 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights); see also World Organization for Human Rights USA, 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Update to the 87th Session of 
the United Nations Human Rights Committee, (June 15, 2006) 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/ngos/ICCPR_shadow 
_report.pdf (arguing that various aspects of the U.S. terror prosecution scheme, 
including detention centers and the use of rendition violate the ICCPR). 
62 Glaberson, supra note 44 (discussing the U.S. government’s intention to try 
six former detainees accused of involvement in the 9/11 attacks by military 
commission). 
63 Id. 
64 See Adam Zagorin, Gitmo Trials: The Political Agenda, TIME, June 8, 2008, 
available at http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1812705,00.html 
(examining the political ramifications of the Guantanamo trials of Khalid Sheikh 
Mohammed and four alleged co-conspirators). 
65 Glaberson, supra note 44. 
66 Id.; see also Adam Zagorin, Alleged 9/11 Plotter Holds Court, TIME, June 5, 
2008, available at http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1812114,00 
.html (“Confessed terrorist mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed told U.S. 
military judge Ralph Kohlman on Thursday that he would represent himself at his 
[trial by military commission], and that he welcomed the death penalty that 
would make him a ‘martyr.’”). 
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This Comment does not take a position on the appropriateness 
of a retributivist attitude toward such defendants,67 as such a 
question is beyond this Comment’s scope.  Rather, this Comment 
argues simply that the dangers of misunderstanding and 
misapplying the willful blindness doctrine may undermine the 
appropriateness and effectiveness of the procedural and structural 
mechanisms used to prosecute such defendants.  On a general 
level, as suggested above, many have posited that military 
commissions are inherently unable to deal with such trials 
adequately because of systematic procedural infirmities.68  On a 
specific level, improper or overbroad interpretation of the 
“knowledge” mens rea requirement—necessary to convict 
defendants at such trials, including those based on the theory of 
willful blindness—is one particular potential procedural infirmity 
on which this Comment focuses.  As argued above, this potential 
problem has special importance in such trials, where the 
consequences are particularly serious and various other procedural 
protections are limited. 
In one such case, the U.S. government has recommended trying 
defendant detainees jointly.69  This result would be desirable for 
government prosecutors but highly disadvantageous to the 
defendants, increasing the risk that a guilt-by-association concept 
will be used to convict them.  The conspiracy charge—one among 
the 169 charges against the detainees—bears out this concern, as 
the government contends that the defendants participated in “a 
long-term, highly sophisticated, organized plan by al-Qaeda to 
attack the United States.”70  As this latter charge in particular 
requires a mens rea of knowledge (which may be satisfied by 
willful blindness), concerns regarding the proper interpretation 
and application of willful blindness are of immediately acute 
 
67 See generally Glaberson, supra note 44 (quoting the spouse of a 9/11 victim 
as saying “if the death of 3,000 people isn’t sufficient for a death penalty in this 
country, then why do we even have the death penalty?”). 
68 Id. (discussing several critiques of the adequacy of military commissions to 
handle a death penalty trial of detainees, quoting a former Guantanamo military 
defense lawyer as saying that “[n]either the system is ready, nor are the defense 
attorneys ready to do a death penalty case in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba“). 
69 Sara Moore, Defense Department Seeks Death Penalty for Six Guantanamo 
Detainees, AM. FORCES PRESS SERV. NEWS ARTICLES, Feb. 11, 2008, available at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=48930 (noting that the 
chief prosecutor recommended trying all six defendants jointly). 
70 Id. 
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importance to current and future terror prosecutions.  However, it 
is important to reemphasize here that the dangers of overinclusive 
use of the willful blindness doctrine apply to any offense requiring 
a mens rea of knowledge, and not merely to conspiracy charges 
alone. 
2.4. Domestic Terror Trials 
In addition to the cases before the military commissions 
discussed above, several trials of those accused of acts of 
international terrorism have taken place in U.S. domestic courts.  
One of the most high profile of such cases occurring in a domestic 
court was that of Zacarias Moussaoui, the alleged would-be 20th 
hijacker in the 9/11 terrorist attacks).71  Notably, that trial also 
specifically involved multiple conspiracy charges,72 which required 
a mens rea of acting knowingly.73 
The Fourth Circuit’s opinion affirming Moussaoui’s conviction 
likewise indicates that some of the procedural erosions described 
earlier in this Section may also be implicated in domestic terror 
prosecutions.  In Moussaoui’s trial the government denied access 
to certain witnesses (other terror suspects in U.S. custody) whom 
Moussaoui sought to interview.  The government claimed that 
provision of unfettered access to such witnesses would threaten 
national security.  Instead, the Government provided redacted 
summaries of those witnesses’ testimony over Moussaoui’s 
objections that the summaries were unreliable, in part due to the 
interrogation tactics allegedly used to obtain such statements.  In 
what has proven to be a controversial portion of the decision, the 
Fourth Circuit generally affirmed the use of such redacted witness 
statements, stating, “we are even more persuaded that the 
[Redacted] process is carefully designed to elicit truthful and 
accurate information from the witnesses. . . .  [T]he jury should be 
 
71 United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2004). 
72 Id. at 457 (describing various conspiracy charges against Moussaoui, 
including “conspiracy to commit aircraft piracy; conspiracy to destroy air-craft; 
conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction; conspiracy to murder United 
States employees; and conspiracy to destroy property” (citations omitted)). 
73 See generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03(1)–(2) (1985) (Proposed Official 
Draft, 1962) (indicating that “[a] person is guilty of conspiracy with another 
person or persons to commit a crime if with the purpose of promoting or 
facilitating its commission” and “knows that a person with whom he conspires to 
commit a crime has conspired with another person or persons to commit the same 
crime” (emphasis added)). 
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informed that the circumstances were designed to elicit truthful 
statements from the witnesses.”74  The deferential attitude of the 
Fourth Circuit to the Government’s national security assertions 
arguably indicates a continuing procedural erosion that those 
accused of international terrorism may experience in terror trials, 
including those before domestic courts.  This kind of erosion 
highlights the importance of reexamining the willful blindness 
doctrine, so that its potentially overinclusive misuse does not 
exacerbate the problem. 
Thus, because domestic terror trials also involve charges 
requiring a mens rea of knowledge, and because certain procedural 
erosions in the rights of the accused exist in domestic courts as 
well, they likewise implicate the lurking problems of overinclusive 
application of the willful blindness doctrine.  In short, the 
problems implicated (or exacerbated) by abuse of the willful 
blindness doctrine exist in both military commissions and domestic 
courts. 
2.5. Foreign Criminal Indictments and Domestic Civil Suits Involving 
U.S. Officials 
Criticism of U.S. strategy and detainee treatment has inspired 
both domestic and international lawsuits launched against U.S. 
political figures.  For example, in November 2006, former Secretary 
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was indicted in Germany for war 
crimes for his role in formulating policies leading to the alleged 
 
74 Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 478, n.31.  To be clear, the Fourth Circuit found no 
problem with the general process of providing the summaries, stating: “Indeed, 
organizing and distilling voluminous information for comprehensible 
presentation to a jury is a hallmark of effective advocacy. In short, while there 
may be problems with the manner in which the Government organized the 
substitutions, the fact that the Government has attempted such organization is not 
a mark against it.”  Id. at 479.  However, the Fourth Circuit remanded the case 
because of the particular manner by which the summaries were organized, and 
the fact that the jury was not given certain information regarding them.  
Nonetheless, the Court noted that the District Court retained broad discretion 
regarding the summaries.  Id. at 478 (“We agree with the district court that in 
order to adequately protect Moussaoui’s right to a fair trial, the jury must be made 
aware of certain information concerning the substitutions.  The particular content 
of any instruction to the jury regarding the substitutions lies within the discretion 
of the district court. . . .”).  The Fourth Circuit did not however take issue with the 
alleged unreliability of the statements elicited through interrogation, stating 
broadly that “[t]he jury should also be instructed that the statements were 
obtained under circumstances that support a conclusion that the statements are 
reliable.”  Id. 
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mistreatment and torture of some detainees in U.S. custody.75  
Other indictments were likewise sought for CIA members 
allegedly involved in the use of extraordinary rendition.76 
Similarly, a former detainee launched a civil complaint against 
current Berkeley law professor John Yoo—a former official in the 
U.S. Department of Justice—in San Francisco, alleging that he was 
tortured during his interrogations by the U.S. military.77  In that 
suit, the former detainee claims that the torture he suffered was 
carried out pursuant to a policy that Yoo and then Assistant 
Attorney General Jay S. Bybee advocated to the U.S. government in 
a now infamous August 2002 memo.78 
Such indictments and civil suits likewise reflect the swell of 
criticism of U.S. terror prosecution policy in the War on Terror.  As 
this Comment argues below, a reexamination of the willful 
blindness doctrine would be a valuable step in responding to and 
addressing such criticism, by helping to restore the procedural 
integrity of the U.S. terror prosecution paradigm. 
3. WILLFUL BLINDNESS AND KNOWLEDGE 
As previously alluded to, willful blindness is a theory of 
liability predicated on knowledge.  Put another way, willful 
blindness is a way of convicting those accused of offenses 
 
75 See Adam Zagorin, Exclusive: Charges Sought Against Rumsfeld Over Prison 
Abuse, TIME, Nov. 10, 2006, available at http://www.time.com/time/nation/ 
article/0,8599,1557842,00.html (describing charges against Donald Rumsfeld). 
76 See id. (discussing then-ongoing investigations in Germany, Italy and 
Spain). 
77 Complaint, Padilla v. Yoo, No. 08-0035 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2008); see also 
Adam Liptak, Padilla Sues U.S. Lawyer Over Detention, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2008, at 
A9 (discussing Padilla’s suit and its theoretical underpinnings attributing 
accomplice liability to Yoo for “[giving] the green light to clearly illegal conduct”); 
Mike Rosen-Molina, Padilla Sues Law Professor Who Helped Frame Bush ‘Torture’ 
Policy (Jan. 4, 2008),  http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2008/01          
/padilla-sues-law-professor-who-helped.php (describing Padilla’s lawsuit and 
Yoo’s background). 
78 Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the 
President, Assistant Attorney General (Aug. 1, 2002), available at 
http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/nytimes/docs/doj 
/bybee80102mem.pdf (examining standards for conducting interrogations under 
U.S. law implementing the Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman 
and Degrading Treatment or Punishment).  The memo was the subject of 
vociferous condemnation by human rights advocates.  See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS 
FIRST, GONZALES ON TORTURE (Dec. 9, 2004), available at 
http://www.humanrightsfirst.com/us_law/etn/gonzales/briefs/brief 
_20041209_Gonz_%20Tort.pdf (criticizing the legal accuracy of the Bybee memo). 
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requiring a mens rea of knowledge.  Thus, this Section begins by 
analyzing the concept of willful blindness as knowledge in U.S. 
criminal law, and introducing the potential problems the doctrine 
creates if abused.  The Section continues by briefly examining the 
concept of knowledge from a philosophical perspective, also 
discussing its relation to understanding.  In doing so, this analysis 
introduces one potential problem implicated by an overbroad 
willful blindness doctrine: the imputation of knowledge to a 
defendant without adequate understanding of the defendant (or 
that defendant’s actual knowledge) by the factfinder.  The Section 
concludes by examining the international criminal law concept of 
joint criminal enterprise liability—a doctrine which both 
encompasses and expands willful blindness—to demonstrate the 
dangerous extremes to which overinclusive interpretation of 
willful blindness can extend if left unchecked. 
3.1. Theory of Willful Blindness in U.S. Criminal Law 
Several theories have been posited as to the underlying roots of 
willful blindness.79  Many have conceptualized willful blindness as 
a theory of knowledge in itself.80  In this view, some conceive of the 
willfully blind defendant as having deliberately avoided 
knowledge of a fact or circumstance in a conscious effort to avoid 
liability for having such knowledge.81  Others offer a similar yet 
distinct interpretation, conceiving of the willfully blind defendant 
as actually knowing of at least a strong probability that the given 
 
79 See United States v. Alston-Graves, 435 F.3d 331, 338 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2006) 
(discussing various theories for willful blindness liability). 
80 See, e.g., United States v. Brodie, 403 F.3d 123, 148 (3d Cir. 2005) (referring 
to the “willful blindness theory of knowledge”); United States v. Wert-Ruiz, 228 
F.3d 250, 255 (3d Cir. 2000) (stating that willful blindness is a “subjective state of 
mind that is deemed to satisfy the scienter requirement of knowledge”) (quoting 
United States v. One 1973 Rolls Royce, 43 F.3d 794, 808 (3d Cir. 1994)). 
81 See, e.g., United States v. Heredia, 483 F.3d 913, 917, 919–20 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(en banc) (clarifying the requirement of deliberate action for conviction under 
willful blindness theory, and approving the use of a two-factor test to determine 
when to issue a willful blindness instruction); United States v. Barnhart, 979 F.2d 
647, 651–52 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that a willful blindness jury instruction 
“should not be given unless there is evidence to support the inference that the 
defendant was aware of a high probability of the existence of the fact in question 
and purposely contrived to avoid learning all of the facts in order to have a 
defense in the event of a subsequent prosecution.”) (quoting United States v. 
Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563, 1571 (11th Cir. 1991)); see also United States v. Heredia, 429 
F.3d 820, 824 (9th Cir. 2005) (3-judge panel decision) (requiring that the 
government prove the required inferences with “specific evidence”). 
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inculpatory fact or circumstance exists, and then taking deliberate 
action to avoid confirming that strong probability.82  In other 
words, these latter theorists treat the willfully blind defendant as 
knowing that an inculpatory fact or circumstance is highly likely 
and taking conscious steps to avoid directly observing proof of it, 
in order to avoid making that likelihood a certainty.83  Still others 
have conceptualized willful blindness slightly differently, by 
identifying willful blindness as a kind of substitute for 
knowledge.84  A variation on this latter theme refers to willful 
blindness as a means by which knowledge is understood or 
implied.85 
For purposes of this Comment, though, willful blindness can 
perhaps best be sufficiently understood as the conscious or 
deliberate avoidance of culpable knowledge—an avoidance which 
is equally punishable for acquiring positive culpable knowledge.86 
3.1.1. Knowledge and Understanding 
As it is in the law, the search for knowledge and truth is also an 
ageless philosophical pursuit.87  The examination of the 
 
82 Heredia, 429 F.3d at 824–25 (“The purpose of the Jewell [willful blindness] 
instruction is to correct for those cases of ‘willful blindness,’ where the defendant 
‘suspects a fact, realizes its probability, but refrains from obtaining final 
confirmation in order to be able to deny knowledge if apprehended.’” (quoting 
United States v. Mapelli, 971 F.2d 284, 286 (9th Cir. 1992)). 
83 See, e.g., United States v. Ramsey, 785 F.2d 184, 190 (7th Cir. 1986) (stating 
that the “central point” of an ostrich instruction is that a person who has enough 
knowledge to prompt an investigation and then avoids further knowledge has 
sufficient knowledge to justify conviction). 
84 See, e.g., Barry Tarlow, RICO Report: ‘Willful Blindness’ as an Alternative to 
Proving Knowledge, 21 CHAMPION 45, 46 (1997) (criticizing a dissenting judge’s 
advocacy of using a willful blindness instruction in a case where no objective or 
subjective evidence of defendant’s guilt was presented as “dangerous reasoning 
[that] flies in the face of the realities in the legal tax and accounting fields”). 
85 See Edward J. Krauland and Aaron R. Hutman, Money Laundering 
Enforcement and Policy, 38 INT’L LAW. 509, 514 n.33 (2004) (“It is well established 
that U.S. courts, where necessary, may apply a conscious avoidance or willful 
blindness standard to the knowledge element under the U.S. criminal anti-money 
laundering statutes . . . .”). 
86 See United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 702–03 (9th Cir. 1976) 
(“‘[K]nowingly’ in criminal statutes is not limited to positive knowledge, but 
includes the state of mind of one who does not possess positive knowledge only 
because he consciously avoided it.”). 
87 Some have gone so far as to claim the search for knowledge is rooted in 
natural law.  See ARISTOTLE, THE METAPHYSICS OF ARISTOTLE 1 (John H. M’Mahon 
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components and limits of knowledge has consumed philosophers 
and scholars alike.88  Numerous thinkers have stressed the 
importance of education and understanding in achieving 
knowledge,89 a view that has become virtually axiomatic over 
time.90  With relevance to the subject of this Comment, under this 
view, the relationship of knowledge to understanding may have 
particular salience, in that a factfinder may use willful blindness to 
determine that a defendant knew of an inculpatory fact or 
deliberately avoided knowing that fact, while the factfinder may 
arguably lack sufficient specific understanding of the defendant’s 
background and belief system to impose such knowledge to him. 
Alternatively, other thinkers have disagreed with the focus on 
education for achieving knowledge,91 stressing the importance of a 
more experiential basis for understanding.92  Similarly, some have 
posited that one’s experiences are not simply the mechanisms by 
which one attains knowledge, but the endpoints of one’s ability to 
know and understand.93  Thus, this latter view likewise suggests a 
possible cultural obstacle to understanding and knowing another,94 
 
trans., H.G. Bohn 1857) (“All men by nature are actuated with the desire of 
knowledge . . . .”). 
88 See, e.g., DIOGENES LAËRTIUS, THE LIVES AND OPINIONS OF EMINENT 
PHILOSOPHERS 69 (Charles Duke Yonge trans., H.G. Bohn 1853) (“[Socrates] used 
also to say . . . that he knew nothing, except the fact of his ignorance.”). 
89 See, e.g., Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF 
ARISTOTLE: THE REVISED OXFORD TRANSLATION 1729, 1730 (Jonathan Barnes ed., W. 
D. Ross trans., Princeton Univ. Press 198) (1984) (“Now each man judges well the 
things he knows, and of these he is a good judge.  And so the man who has been 
educated in a subject is a good judge of that subject, and the man who has 
received an all-round education is a good judge in general.”). 
90 See generally FRANK HERBERT, GOD EMPEROR OF DUNE 163 (Berkley Books, 
1984) (1981) (“[T]he beginning of knowledge [is] the discovery of something we 
do not understand.”). 
91 See, e.g., Heraclitus, Heraclitus of Ephesus on Nature, fragment XVI, in THE 
FRAGMENTS OF THE WORK OF HERACLITUS OF EPHESUS ON NATURE 84, 88 (W.H.S. 
Jones trans., Press of Isaac Friedenwald 1888) (“Much learning does not teach one 
to have understanding. . . .”). 
92 See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 61 
(J.F. Dove 1690) (1828) (“Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white 
paper, void of all characters, without any ideas; how comes it to be furnished? . . .  
Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge?  To this I answer, in one 
word, from experience; in that all our knowledge is founded; and from that it 
ultimately derives itself.”). 
93 See id. at 68  (“No man’s knowledge . . . can go beyond his experience.”). 
94 See generally Brian Caterino, Power and Interpretation in MAKING POLITICAL 
SCIENCE MATTER: DEBATING KNOWLEDGE, RESEARCH, AND METHOD 137 (Sanford 
Schram & Brian Caterino eds., NYU Press 2006) (“Neo-Aristotelians limit the 
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which may limit the factfinder’s ability to accurately impute 
culpable knowledge to a defendant.  Such views, of course, do not 
necessarily indicate a dichotomy in the paths to knowledge; 
instead, it suffices for the purposes of this Comment to note that 
multiple avenues for attaining knowledge have been suggested, 
some focusing on education, and other focusing on the importance 
of direct experience.  Both avenues are particularly relevant to the 
concept of willful blindness (and knowledge generally), as they 
highlight some potential limitations on U.S. factfinders’ ability to 
adequately establish terror defendants’ liability for offenses 
requiring a finding of knowledge. 
3.2. U.S. Legal Rule on Willful Blindness 
The legal rule governing when a willful blindness instruction 
may be given to a jury may be concisely summarized as follows: a 
willful blindness instruction is properly given when the jury could 
find a) that the defendant was subjectively aware of a high 
probability of the existence of a fact or circumstance, and b) that 
the defendant deliberately acted (or “closed his eyes”) to avoid 
inculpatory knowledge of that fact or circumstance.95 
Courts have repeatedly made clear that willful blindness is to 
be evaluated from the subjective viewpoint of the defendant, rather 
than from the objective view of a reasonable person in the 
defendant’s situation.96  Courts similarly require evidence of the 
 
horizon of the social world to the boundaries of a given culture or ethos shared by 
members of a community.”). 
95 See United States v. Leahy, 445 F.3d 634, 652–54 (3d Cir. 2006); United 
States v. Khorozian, 333 F.3d 498, 508 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting that evidence 
supported a jury instruction on willful blindness in case where defendants sold 
repossessed vehicles at above market prices); United States v. Stewart, 185 F.3d 
112, 126 (3d Cir. 1999) (supporting a willful blindness jury instruction); United 
States v. Inv. Enters., Inc., 10 F.3d 263, 268 (5th Cir. 1993) (discussing when willful 
blindness applies). 
96 See, e.g., United States v. Caminos, 770 F.2d 361, 365 (3d Cir. 1985) (stating 
that “the judge’s version of the deliberate ignorance instruction must make clear 
that the defendant himself was subjectively aware of the high probability of the 
fact in question, and not merely that a reasonable man would have been aware of 
the probability.” (internal quotations omitted)); Khorozian, 333 F.3d at 508 (willful 
blindness instructions are proper when the defendant was “subjectively aware of 
the high probability of the fact in question, and not merely that a reasonable man 
would have been aware of the probability.” (quoting Stewart, 185 F.3d at 126)); 
United States v. Oppong, 165 F. App’x 155, 163 (3d Cir. 2006) (upholding drug 
trafficking conviction where “the District Court properly focused on the 
defendants’ subjective awareness”). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
718 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 30:2 
 
defendant’s particularized deliberate avoidance before giving a 
willful blindness instruction to the jury.97  Such evidence may take 
the form of “overt physical acts” or “purely psychological 
avoidance,” the latter defined as “a cutting off of one’s normal 
curiosity by effort of the will.”98  Perhaps predictably, courts have 
struggled to define the parameters for psychological acts of 
avoidance,99 while others have resisted the physical/psychological 
dichotomization altogether.100 
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that this 
subjective awareness requirement is supplemented (or arguably 
undermined) by allowing juries to rely upon “reasonable 
inferences” from the evidence.101  Predictably, courts have 
struggled to define the boundaries of reasonable inferences, 
acknowledging the potential problems of their elasticity.102  
Moreover, some courts’ efforts to rein in the dangers of cascading 
inferences are frustrated by the settled principle that circumstantial 
evidence may also support a reasonable inference of knowledge.103  
 
97 See, e.g., United States v. Stout, No. 89-317-1-2-3, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
12343, at *105–06 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 18, 1990) (holding ostrich instruction proper on 
remand for mail fraud defendant where evidence showed he acted willful by 
refusing to consider motions to limit his authority at executive board meetings 
and refusing to discuss certain expenditures, thus deliberately avoiding learning 
of his actual lack of authority). 
98 United States v. Carrillo, 435 F.3d 767, 780 (7th Cir. 2006).  The Third 
Circuit has upheld ostrich instructions regarding deliberate ignorance based on 
the same two categories of evidence, but it has not specifically identified the 
categories as such.  See, e.g., United States v. Wasserson, 418 F.3d 225, 237–39 (3d 
Cir. 2005); United States v. Brodie, 403 F.3d 123 (3d Cir. 2005). 
99 The Seventh Circuit attempted to clarify the contours of the psychological 
avoidance category by stating that the cutting off of one’s “normal curiosity” must 
be a deliberate act rather than passive omission.  See Leahy, 464 F.3d at 796 
(acknowledging while there are difficulties in “distinguishing between the cutting 
off of one’s curiosity and a simple lack of effort,” the latter is not punishable). 
100 See, e.g., Wasserson, 418 F.3d at 237–39 (discussing the defendant’s willful 
blindness as evidenced by physical acts and psychological avoidance without 
expressly defining each category as distinct). 
101 See, e.g., Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 149 n.19 (1994) (stating that 
a jury may determine the defendant’s culpable knowledge by “drawing 
reasonable inferences from the evidence of defendant’s conduct”). 
102 See, e.g., United States v. Bycer, 593 F.2d 549, 550 (3d Cir. 1979) 
(“Inferences from established facts are accepted methods of proof when no direct 
evidence is available.  It is essential, however, that there be a logical and 
convincing connection between the facts established and the conclusion 
inferred.”). 
103 See, e.g., United States v. Rahseparian, 231 F.3d 1257, 1262 (10th Cir. 2000) 
(stating that circumstantial evidence may support a jury’s inference of defendant’s 
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Other courts, however, have been less reticent about expanding the 
doctrine’s reach with regard to inferential proof,104 arguably 
exacerbating the problem of the doctrine’s current overbreadth. 
3.2.1. Willfulness Versus Negligence 
At its heart, liability under willful blindness requires a mens 
rea of willfulness or knowledge.105  This requirement precludes 
liability for lesser mental states such as recklessness or 
negligence.106  Thus, willful blindness requires that the accused be 
subjectively aware of the inculpatory fact or circumstance, rather 
than that an objective hypothetical “reasonable person” would 
have or should have known of the same.107  Stated another way, 
merely showing that a defendant should have known a fact or 
 
guilt, but that such an inference is reasonable only if the conclusion probably 
flows from facts, rather than where jury engages in speculation and conjecture 
leading to a mere guess or possibility). 
104 See, e.g., United States v. Ramsey, 785 F.2d 184, 191 n.1 (7th Cir. 1986) 
(expressing approval of a model jury instruction that includes the sentence: “[i]t is 
entirely up to you as to whether you find any deliberate closing of the eyes, and 
the inference to be drawn from any such evidence.”). 
105 See generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b) (defining “knowingly” as a 
culpable mental state); id. § 2.02(8) (“Requirement of Wilfulness [sic] Satisfied by 
Acting Knowingly.  A requirement that an offense be committed wilfully [sic] is 
satisfied if a person acts knowingly with respect to the material elements of the 
offense, unless a purpose to impose further requirements appears.”); see also id. 
106 See Hagemann & Grinstein, supra note 4, at 223–24 (“As Jewell emphasized, 
however, the concept of willful blindness does not reduce the mens rea 
requirement of criminal offenses: ‘The substantive justification for the rule is that 
deliberate ignorance and positive knowledge are equally culpable.’  To be 
convicted of a crime under a willful blindness theory, a defendant must still act 
consciously to evade conditions that might create criminal liability.  Accordingly, 
willful blindness involves a higher level of criminal intent than mere negligence 
or recklessness.  As the Third Circuit has explained: ‘[T]he mainstream conception 
of willful blindness [is that it is] a state of mind of much greater culpability than 
simple negligence or recklessness, and more akin to knowledge.’  Therefore, when 
individuals are willfully blind, they can be said to have acted culpably, and to 
punish them for offenses requiring conscious criminal intent comports with the 
hierarchical design of scienter in the criminal law.” (citations omitted)); see also 
Recent Cases, Ninth Circuit Holds That Motive Is Not an Element of Willful Blindness, 
121 HARV. L. REV. 1245, 1249 (2008) (arguing that current willful blindness 
doctrine improperly “occupies a nebulous position between the mens rea 
standards of knowledge and recklessness”); see generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 
2.02(2) (defining and separating four levels of culpability for those who act 
purposely, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently). 
107 See generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(5) (explaining that if a defendant 
satisfies a culpable mental state for an element of an offense, such a mental state 
also satisfies material elements requiring lesser levels of culpability). 
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circumstance at issue is insufficient to sustain a conviction for an 
offense requiring a mens rea of knowledge or willfulness, and thus 
the same showing is insufficient to permit convicting a defendant 
based on willful blindness.  The same logic applies to the second 
element of willful blindness, requiring that the defendant act 
deliberately to avoid culpable knowledge. 
3.2.2.   Increasingly Frequent Use and Expansion of the Doctrine in 
U.S. Law 
The use of willful blindness instructions has increased 
dramatically in recent years.108  The increasingly frequent usage of 
the instructions augments the potential for misunderstanding or 
misconstruing the doctrine to have a wide impact.  However, the 
problems with the willful blindness doctrine are not only 
quantitative, but qualitative as well, as courts have been willing to 
expand the reach of the willful blindness doctrine to both an 
increasing number and scope of crimes in recent years. 
Perhaps the scope extension most salient to this Comment is 
the newly approved application of the doctrine to cases involving 
the crime of conspiracy,109 a frequent charge in terror trials.  While 
 
108 See, e.g., United States v. Alston-Graves, 435 F.3d 331, 338 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 
2006) (listing numerous recent decisions using willful blindness instructions in a 
wide range of cases). 
109 For cases upholding the issuance of willful blindness instructions to the 
jury in conspiracy cases despite defense arguments regarding their logical 
inconsistency, see, for example, United States v. Svoboda, 347 F.3d 471, 479 (2d 
Cir. 2003); United States v. Aulicino, 44 F.3d 1102, 1115 (2d Cir. 1995); United 
States v. Inv. Enters., Inc., 10 F.3d 263, 268–69 (5th Cir. 1993).  For definitions of 
the crime of conspiracy, see 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994) (defining the crime of 
conspiracy as follows: “If two or more persons conspire either to commit any 
offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency 
thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do 
any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than five years, or both.  If, however, the offense, the 
commission of which is the object of the conspiracy, is a misdemeanor only, the 
punishment for such conspiracy shall not exceed the maximum punishment 
provided for such misdemeanor.”); United States v. Parks, 68 F.3d 860, 866 (5th 
Cir. 1995) (holding that elements of conspiracy include proof of an agreement to 
commit a crime, knowing participation by the defendant, and an overt act 
committed in furtherance of the agreement); MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03(1)–(2) 
(indicating that “[a] person is guilty of conspiracy with another person or persons 
to commit a crime if with the purpose of promoting or facilitating its commission” 
and “knows that a person with whom he conspires to commit a crime has 
conspired with another person or persons to commit the same crime”).  See also 
Todd R. Russell & O. Carter Snead, Federal Criminal Conspiracy, 35 AM. CRIM. L. 
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the dangers of overbroad construction of the willful blindness 
doctrine extend to all charges requiring a mens rea of knowledge, 
the specific application to conspiracy charges poses special risks to 
defendants.  Extending willful blindness to conspiracy charges 
exponentially increases the overbreadth dangers of willful 
blindness doctrine, as one may infer, a priori, the defendant’s 
participation in the conspiracy by circumstantial evidence.110  This 
danger is heightened further by a widely appreciated prosecutorial 
affinity for conspiracy charges, and the relative ease with which 
prosecutors regard conspiracy convictions, as opposed to other 
charges.111  Combined with the permissibility of inferring 
knowledge from circumstantial evidence, this presents a 
potentially crippling scenario for defendants.  Thus, the expansion 
of willful blindness doctrine to conspiracy charges may compound 
the dangers of overbreadth by allowing for convictions based on a 
stream of cascading inferences which are improperly drawn by the 
factfinder. 
3.3. Willful Blindness in International Criminal Law:  Joint Criminal 
Enterprise 
While this Comment has thus far discussed domestic law, the 
criminalization of knowing or willful participation in criminal 
activity is also common in international criminal law.112  As such, 
 
REV. 739, 741–42 nn.14, 15 (1998) (discussing elements of federal conspiracy in 
various circuits). 
110 See, e.g., Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942) (“Participation in a 
criminal conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence; a common purpose 
and plan may be inferred from a ‘development and collocation of circumstances.’” 
(internal quotations omitted) (quoting United States v. Manton, 107 F.2d 834, 839 
(2d Cir. 1938)). 
111 See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 919 F.2d 435, 439 (7th Cir. 1990) 
(arguing that the appearance of a conspiracy charge against the defendant “is 
inevitable because prosecutors seem to have conspiracy on their word processors 
as Count I; rare is the case omitting such a charge”); Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The 
Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts III & IV, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 920, 948 (1987) (“[T]he 
procedural and evidentiary consequences directly or indirectly associated with a 
conspiracy charge make conspiracy charges attractive to prosecutors, and create 
possibilities of abuse.”); Neal Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1307, 
1310 n.4 (2003) (discussing the frequency of conspiracy charges being brought in 
criminal trials).  See also Danner & Martinez, supra note 50, at 137 (describing 
conspiracy as the “darling of the U.S. prosecutor’s nursery”). 
112 A representative example of this may be found in the U.N. Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime, which reads in relevant part as follows: 
Article 5. Criminalization of participation in an organized criminal group. 
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international criminal law also tacitly accepts the theory of willful 
blindness as encompassing crimes for which acting knowingly or 
willfully is a material element of an offense.  However, the concept 
of willful blindness itself is largely eclipsed in international 
jurisprudence by the more expansive doctrine of joint criminal 
enterprise liability113 [hereinafter “JCE”].  As the reader will 
quickly discern, the dangers of JCE—particularly its overbreadth—
largely mirror the dangers of overbroad willful blindness 
jurisprudence.  In this way, the discussion of JCE and its criticism 
will inform our understanding of willful blindness, and specifically 
will demonstrate how an extreme construction of willful blindness 
can endanger a defendant’s right to a presumption of innocence. 
Under the “implicit” theory of JCE,114 “an individual may be 
held responsible for all crimes committed pursuant to the existence 
 
1. Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures 
as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences, when 
committed intentionally: 
(a) Either or both of the following as criminal offences distinct 
from those involving the attempt or completion of the criminal 
activity: 
(i) Agreeing with one or more other persons to commit a 
serious crime . . . ; 
(ii) Conduct by a person who, with knowledge of either the 
aim and general criminal activity of an organized criminal 
group or its intention to commit the crimes in question, 
takes an active part in: 
a. Criminal activities of the organized criminal group; 
b. Other activities of the organized criminal group in 
the knowledge that his or her participation will 
contribute to the achievement of the above-described 
criminal aim; 
(b) Organizing, directing, aiding, abetting, facilitating or 
counselling the commission of serious crime involving an 
organized criminal group. 
United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and the 
Protocols Thereto art. 5(1), opened for signature Dec. 12, 2000, S. Treaty Doc. No. 
108-16, 2225 U.N.T.S. 209. 
113 See generally Danner & Martinez, supra note 50 (discussing the joint 
criminal enterprise theory of liability and its prevalence in international law). 
114 See id. at 103 (“The form of liability known as ‘joint criminal enterprise’ or 
‘common plan’ is not explicitly described in the statute of the ICTY or ICTR, 
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of a common plan or design . . . if the defendant participates with 
others in the common design.”115  By way of explanation, three 
broad categories of JCE liability have been articulated: (1) acting 
with the same criminal intent pursuant to a common criminal 
design;116 (2) knowingly participating in a “system[] of ill-
treatment” (such as a concentration camp);117 and, in the broadest 
and most controversial category, (3) common liability for acts by 
members of the enterprise which are “natural and foreseeable 
consequence[s]” of the common design.118  The first and second 
categories may be broadly analogized to a version of conspiracy in 
U.S. law.119  However, the third category has much more far-
reaching consequences, extending liability to a defendant for 
activities by other members done without that defendant’s 
knowledge or consent, so long as the others’ activities or their 
consequences were foreseeable (rather than that they were actually 
foreseen, for example).  Thus, whereas a proper construction of 
willful blindness theoretically enables liability only for knowledge 
and intent, JCE allows for liability for knowledge, recklessness,120 
negligence, or even mere association121 with those involved in a 
criminal enterprise.  This latter scheme provides international 
 
although the judges have found that it is implicitly included in the language of 
Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute.”). 
115 See id. (citing Prosecutor v. Vasiljević, Judgement [sic], ICTY Appeals 
Chamber, paras. 94–101, Case No. IT-98-32-A (Feb. 25, 2004)). 
116 Id. at 105. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 106 (stating that a “defendant who intends to participate in a 
common design may be found guilty of acts outside that design if such acts are a 
‘natural and foreseeable consequence of the effecting of that common purpose.’” 
(quoting Prosecutor v. Tadić, Judgement [sic], ICTY Appeals Chamber, para. 183, 
Case No. IT-94-1-A (July 15, 1999)). 
119 For definitions of conspiracy, see sources cited in note 109, supra. 
120 See Danner & Martinez supra note 50, at 102 (stating that under Article 7(1) 
of the ICTY Statute and Article 6(1) of the ICTR statute a defendant may be found 
liable for committing or planning to commit a crime if the defendant “intend[s] to 
plan or . . . commit the crime or [is] ‘aware[] of the substantial likelihood that a 
criminal act or omission would occur as a consequence of his conduct.’” (citing 
Prosecutor v. Kvočka, Judgement [sic], ICTY Trial Chamber, para. 251, Case No. 
IT-98-30/1-T (Nov. 2, 2001))). 
121 See id. at 137 (discussing the potential for JCE defendants to be convicted 
through guilt by association). 
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prosecutors with a remarkably powerful weapon which some have 
argued inequitably tips the scales against the accused.122 
Additionally, those convicted under the JCE theory are subject 
to punishment for all substantive acts of other members of the 
criminal enterprise.123  Practitioners in the United States may liken 
this to the concept of Pinkerton liability,124 whereby the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that each co-conspirator may be held 
criminally responsible for substantive criminal acts undertaken in 
furtherance of the conspiracy.125  While such a framework of 
liability has been sharply criticized and largely rejected in U.S. 
law,126 some have defended the usefulness of JCE’s broader scope 
in the uniquely complex context of international criminal law.127  
 
122 Id. (“Joint criminal enterprise raises the specter of guilt by association and 
provides ammunition to those who doubt the rigor and impartiality of the 
international forum.  If conspiracy is the darling of the U.S. prosecutor’s nursery, 
then it is difficult to see how JCE can amount to anything less than the nuclear 
bomb of the international prosecutor’s arsenal.”) (citations omitted). 
123 Id. at 115. 
124 See id. at 115–16 (discussing the similarity of JCE to the rejected U.S. 
doctrine of Pinkerton liability); Mark Osiel, The Banality of Good: Aligning Incentives 
Against Mass Atrocity, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1785–86  (2005) (“The final type of 
participation involves criminal acts beyond the common design, but a natural and 
foreseeable consequence of effecting it.  This resembles U.S. rules on Pinkerton 
conspiracies and felony murder and is therefore the most controversial expression 
of the doctrine.” (citations and internal quotations omitted)). 
125 Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647 (1946) (“The governing 
principle is the same when the substantive offense is committed by one of the 
conspirators in furtherance of the unlawful project. . . .  Each conspirator 
instigated the commission of the crime.  The unlawful agreement contemplated 
precisely what was done. . . .  [T]he overt act of one partner in crime is attributable 
to all. . . .  If that can be supplied by the act of one conspirator, we fail to see why 
the same or other acts in furtherance of the conspiracy are likewise not 
attributable to the others for the purpose of holding them responsible for the 
substantive offense.” (citations omitted)). 
126 The Pinkerton theory of liability for substantive acts of co-conspirators has 
been strongly criticized and rejected by many state courts.  See, e.g., Bolden v. 
State, 124 P.3d 191, 198–99 (Nev. 2005) (stating that “the Pinkerton rule has 
garnered significant disfavor” and describing rejection of the theory in several 
states); see also Danner & Martinez, supra note 50, at 115–16 (“Today, many U.S. 
states, as well as the influential Model Penal Code, have rejected Pinkerton 
liability, although it still plays a prominent role in federal prosecutions.” (citing 
SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 693 (7th ed. 2001)). 
127 See Osiel, supra note 124, at 1786 (“Enterprise participation appeals to 
international prosecutors for its reach beyond the formal military hierarchy to 
civilian bosses and paramilitaries over whom no command is exercised.  The 
doctrine will also be valuable in reaching the many new private armies to which 
states increasingly subcontract military work, including combat itself.  The 
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Similarly to willful blindness in U.S. domestic courts, the use of 
and reliance on JCE by international courts is on the rise.128 
United States courts have not endorsed the concept of JCE 
specifically, and some state courts have rejected doctrinal variants 
of it.129  However, some scholars have alleged that the theories of 
liability espoused in U.S. military commissions demonstrate 
striking similarity to the doctrine.130  This alleged similarity should 
thus inform discussion of the prosecutorial scheme employed in 
the War on Terror against those accused of acts of international 
terrorism.  While JCE may not be specifically used in military 
commissions, such criticism should cause us to examine the 
dangers of overbreadth and guilt-by-association techniques which 
may contribute to such prosecutions.  Additionally, it is 
particularly poignant then that the JCE doctrine has been criticized 
on substantially similar grounds to that of the willful blindness 
doctrine,131 and likewise has been the subject of many calls for 
reform.132 
 
amplitude and elasticity of enterprise participation lets indictments transcend the 
confines of a bureaucracy to the informal networks connecting it to other 
individuals and organizations, often exercising greater power than many within.” 
(citations omitted)). 
128 See Danner & Martinez, supra note 50, at 107 (“Joint criminal enterprise is 
becoming increasingly important at the ICTY.  One indication of its centrality to 
contemporary ICTY practice is the frequency with which recent indictments have 
rested the accused’s liability on this basis.”  (citation omitted)). 
129 See, e.g., Oates v. State, 627 A.2d 555, 559 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993) (“Each 
joint participant in a crime enjoys a unique level of blameworthiness that neither 
controls nor is controlled by the level of blameworthiness of any other joint 
participant.”). 
130 See Danner & Martinez, supra note 50, at 80 (“The military commissions 
instituted by the U.S. government to try suspected terrorists include both 
command responsibility and a liability theory that closely resembles joint criminal 
enterprise, and the first indictments of Guantanamo detainees implicitly rely on 
this joint criminal enterprise theory of liability.” (citation omitted)). 
131 Kai Ambos, Joint Criminal Enterprise and Command Responsibility, 5 J. INT’L 
CRIM. JUST. 159, 167–76 (2007) (discussing perceived conflicts in JCE doctrine, 
particularly with regard to the requisite level of culpability for conviction). 
132 See Danner & Martinez, supra note 50, at 79 (“[I]f not limited 
appropriately, [the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise liability has] the potential 
to lapse into forms of guilt by association, thereby undermining the legitimacy 
and the ultimate effectiveness of international criminal law.  Doctrinal reforms 
may help avoid this danger.”).  One of the most frequently suggested reforms 
includes adopting a substantial contribution requirement, thus requiring a 
stronger showing of intent on the part of the defendant member of the criminal 
enterprise, in order to minimize the risk of mere guilt by association.  See, e.g., 
Jacob A. Ramer, Hate by Association: Joint Criminal Enterprise Liability for 
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In the broader scheme, the United States has shown 
ambivalence toward the applicability of international law concepts 
in domestic courts.  While the Supreme Court noted many years 
ago that international law is part of U.S. law,133 some courts have 
only recently embraced applying it in U.S. cases.134  The current 
Supreme Court has been divided on the applicability of 
international law to domestic cases.135  That division leaves the 
applicability of specific international law concepts such as JCE in 
flux going forward within the U.S. domestic prosecutorial scheme.  
However, as alluded to earlier, the specific dangers of 
overinclusive JCE jurisprudence internationally mirror the dangers 
 
Persecution, 7 CHI.-KENT J. INT’L COMP. L. 31, 110–12 (2007) (recommending the 
addition of a substantial contribution requirement). 
133 See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (“International law is 
part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice 
of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending upon it are 
duly presented for their determination.”). 
134 See generally Associated Press, Supreme Court Justices Spar over International 
Law, Jan. 18, 2005, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1105364112559 
(discussing Justice Scalia’s critique of U.S. judges relying on international law to 
decide cases); BLAKESLEY, supra note 5, at 307 (discussing the Bush 
administration’s antipathy toward customary international law and the 
International Criminal Court).  But see Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 635 
(2006) (holding that military commissions at Guantanamo Bay violated Common 
Article 3 of the Third Geneva Convention). 
135 For an illustrative example of the competing arguments between Supreme 
Court justices on the issue within a single case, compare Medellín v. Texas, No. 
06-984, 2008 WL 3821478 (U.S. Aug. 5, 2008) (per curiam) (arguing that 
Congressional failure to properly “implement” the Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations—a treaty to which the U.S. is a party—renders U.S. courts free 
to disregard both it and an ICJ decision interpreting it in deciding whether a 
violation of it justifies granting a convicted defendants’ request for a stay of 
execution in part because the treaty “does not itself have the force and effect of 
domestic law sufficient to set aside the judgment or the ensuing sentence”) with 
Medellín v. Texas, No. 06-984, 2008 WL 3821478, *4 (U.S. Aug. 5, 2008) (Breyer, J. 
dissenting) (arguing that the Court’s failure to grant the defendants’ requested 
stay of execution “places the United States irremediably in violation of 
international law and breaks our treaty promises;” recommending that the Court 
seek the views of the Solicitor General to determine the proper resolution of the 
case).  See also Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1359–67 (2008) (majority opinion) 
(arguing that ICJ judgments are not “automatically enforceable” in U.S. courts 
under the U.N. Charter, particularly where the underlying treaties giving rise to 
the cause of action are not “self-executing”); id. at 1389 (Breyer, J. dissenting) 
(arguing that “the United States’ treaty obligation to comply with the ICJ 
judgment in Avena is enforceable in court in this case without further 
congressional action beyond Senate ratification of the relevant treaties. . . .  [T]he 
ICJ judgment before us is judicially enforceable without further legislative 
action.”). 
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of overinclusive willful blindness jurisprudence domestically, and 
are useful to inform any discussion of willful blindness.  Thus, 
while JCE is not specifically applied under the U.S. prosecution 
scheme against terror defendants, the concerns and critiques that 
have been lodged against the doctrine should inform our 
evaluation of the willful blindness doctrine and the latter’s 
application to such defendants. 
4. CRITICISM AND IMPROPER USE OF THE WILLFUL BLINDNESS 
DOCTRINE 
Several arguments strongly criticizing the willful blindness 
doctrine exist, attacking it on multiple fronts.  However, the central 
practical criticism of the doctrine as it exists today is rooted in a 
failure to properly explain its requirement of willfulness, and a 
concurrent failure to distinguish willfulness from the lesser mens 
rea of negligence.  These failures have led to a confused doctrinal 
application and the real threat of overinclusive convictions.  These 
critiques are relevant to one’s understanding of what willful 
blindness is, how it may be improperly used, and how it ought to 
be properly applied.  Additionally, these critiques highlight some 
of the problems and dangers of the willful blindness doctrine and 
why, as this Comment argues, a reexamination of the doctrine is 
essential to ensure that it is used properly, particularly in the cases 
of those accused of acts of international terrorism. 
This Section examines the confusion in current willful 
blindness doctrine, focusing on the central problem of its failure to 
effectively distinguish willfulness from negligence.  The Section 
then examines the related problem of overly complex jury 
instructions on willful blindness.  It concludes with some courts’ 
suggested approaches for reforming and limiting the willful 
blindness doctrine. 
4.1. Confusion Between Willfulness/Knowledge and Negligence 
Judge Richard Posner eloquently identified what many have 
found to be the central problematic issue posed by willful 
blindness instructions, stating: 
 The most powerful criticism of the ostrich instruction is, 
precisely, that its tendency is to allow juries to convict upon 
a finding of negligence for crimes that require intent.  The 
criticism can be deflected by thinking carefully about just 
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what it is that real ostriches do . . . .  They are not merely 
careless birds.  They bury their heads in the sand so that 
they will not see or hear bad things.  They deliberately avoid 
acquiring unpleasant knowledge.  The ostrich instruction is 
designed for cases in which there is evidence that the 
defendant, knowing or strongly suspecting that he is 
involved in shady dealings, takes steps to make sure that he 
does not acquire full or exact knowledge of the nature and 
extent of those dealings.  A deliberate effort to avoid guilty 
knowledge is all the guilty knowledge the law requires.136 
As Judge Posner implies, while willful blindness is meant to 
permit convictions for those who make a “deliberate effort” to 
avoid inculpatory knowledge, if the factfinder does not properly 
appreciate the distinction between the deliberate actor and the 
negligent actor—the distinction between the ostrich who buries his 
head in the sand and the merely “careless birds”—that confusion 
may lead factfinders to convict the latter improperly.  Posner also 
suggests that for a willful blindness conviction to occur, the 
factfinder must determine that the defendant is more like the 
ostrich—the defendant “takes steps” to deliberately avoid culpable 
knowledge—than a careless bird, who ought to have known the 
culpable fact or circumstance but did not.  In short, a factfinder 
who misconstrues the proper meaning of willful blindness liability 
by failing to fully understand that distinction may improperly 
convict a defendant for a knowledge-based offense when the 
defendant was merely negligent.  Numerous scholars have echoed 
this criticism.137 
 
136 United States v. Giovannetti, 919 F.2d 1223, 1228 (7th Cir. 1990) (citations 
omitted) (reversing gambling conviction in part due to an improper willful 
blindness instruction). 
137 See, e.g., Ninth Circuit Holds That Motive Is Not an Element of Willful 
Blindness, supra note 106, at 1249–50 (“An instruction that does not distinguish 
between more and less culpable forms of willful blindness lowers the underlying 
crime’s mens rea standard from knowledge to recklessness, potentially leading to 
unfair convictions.”); Jonathan L. Marcus, Model Penal Code Section 2.02(7) and 
Willful Blindness, 102 YALE L.J. 2231, 2248 (1993) (“[A] jury may indeed interpret 
deliberate ignorance to mean that the defendant may be convicted because she 
should have known the fact—i.e., a negligence standard . . . .  [A]llowing a jury 
instruction that facilitates conviction only when the government presents a 
weaker case.” (emphasis omitted)); Ira P. Robbins, The Ostrich Instruction: 
Deliberate Ignorance as a Criminal Mens Rea, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 191, 227– 
31 (1990) (criticizing willful blindness instructions’ tendency to permit convictions 
for offenses requiring willfulness with mere proof of negligence). 
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This confusion or conflation between knowledge and 
negligence is perhaps the central fault line demonstrating how the 
willful blindness doctrine, when misconstrued overbroadly, poses 
real dangers to defendants of overinclusive convictions.  This 
concern is particularly heightened where the conviction of a terror 
defendant often results in execution.  The consequences of 
improperly lowering the mens rea for an offense may be dire for 
defendants, who may be unjustly convicted of offenses based on 
that impropriety.  What this means is that a misconstrual of willful 
blindness which does not clearly outline the requirements of 
willfulness versus negligence risks the conviction and subsequent 
execution of those who are merely negligent, but are charged with 
acts requiring knowledge.  While this concern applies with special 
relevance to terror trials, it is clear that the problem of improper 
convictions based on misconstrual of doctrinal mens rea 
requirements is one that should be examined in other contexts as 
well. 
4.1.1. Complexity of Willful Blindness Jury Instructions 
Courts and scholars have identified numerous reasons for the 
problem of improperly overbroad and misunderstood application 
of willful blindness liability.  One key factor contributing to this 
problem is undoubtedly that of virtually incomprehensible jury 
instructions on willful blindness.  Often delivered in 
extraordinarily complex legalese, such jury instructions may often 
be of little use to a lay juror, who arguably cannot be expected to 
comprehend the subtle distinctions obscured by such language. 
Two representative examples help illustrate this point.  First, 
the Eighth Circuit’s model jury instruction on willful blindness 
states in relevant part, “[t]he element of knowledge may be 
inferred if the defendant deliberately closed [his] eyes to what 
would otherwise have been obvious . . . .  You may not find the 
defendant acted ‘knowingly’ if you find he/she was merely 
negligent, careless or mistaken.”138  Second, the Seventh Circuit’s 
model instruction on knowledge tells jurors that to act 
“knowingly” means “that the defendant realized what he was 
doing and was aware of the nature of his conduct, and did not act 
 
138 JUDICIAL COMMITTEE ON MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT, 
MANUAL OF MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE 
EIGHTH CIRCUIT § 7.04 (2006) [hereinafter 8TH CIR. INSTRUCTIONS] (citations and 
internal brackets omitted). 
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through ignorance, mistake or accident.”139  The Seventh Circuit 
further instructs that a juror “may infer knowledge from a 
combination of suspicion and indifference . . . .  If you find that a 
person had a strong suspicion that things were not what they 
seemed or that someone had withheld some important facts, yet 
shut his eyes for fear of what he would learn, you may conclude 
that he acted knowingly.”140  Moreover, the Seventh Circuit 
instruction never mentions the phrase willful blindness or its 
equivalents; instead, it subsumes the concept into the general 
ambit of knowledge. 
While such instructions mention the distinction between 
willfulness and negligence, it is at least doubtful that the lay juror 
will understand that distinction absent further explanation.  Such 
obtuse language assumes knowledge of legal subtleties rarely 
shared by lay-jurors.  Similarly, while the above instructions do 
mention the exceptions of negligence and mistake, they bury the 
concepts in jargon and the passive voice.  As a result, the 
instruction may fail to convey the subtle distinction between 
inferential knowledge and negligence to lay jurors, thus rendering 
it largely ineffective in promoting a proper application of the 
willful blindness theory.141 
One may take solace in the fact that judges have discretion in 
altering the language of a model jury instruction.142  Nonetheless, 
judges may be swayed by the legislature’s ironic commentary that 
model instructions are drafted with the intention of being “clear, 
brief and simple instructions calculated to maximize jury 
 
139 COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SEVENTH 
CIRCUIT, PATTERN CRIMINAL FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT § 
4.06 (1998) [hereinafter 7TH CIR. INSTRUCTIONS]. 
140 Id. 
141 Some have gone so far as to argue that willful blindness instructions 
which are constructed or issued inappropriately may implicate violations of a 
defendant’s constitutional rights.  See Linda S. Eads, From Capone to Boesky: Tax 
Evasion, Insider Trading, and Problems of Proof, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1421, 1482 (1991) 
(criticizing appellate courts that affirm convictions such as those with willful 
blindness instructions based on insufficient circumstantial evidence, saying, 
“[a]ffirming such convictions thus seems ‘fair’ in a moral sense.  But it is not fair 
in a constitutional sense”). 
142 See 8TH CIR. INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 138, at introductory note (“These are 
intended to be model, not mandatory, instructions and should be modified as 
appropriate to more clearly and precisely present issues to the jury.”); see also 
United States v. Goldblatt, 813 F.2d 619, 623 (3d Cir. 1987) (“It is . . . within the 
sound discretion of the trial judge to determine the particular language to be 
employed when charging the jury.” (citations omitted)). 
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comprehension.”143  While some have scoffed at such an 
assertion,144 evidence suggests that judges often rely upon model 
instructions.145  Alternatively, some have argued the willful 
blindness doctrine has become so muddled that judges themselves 
confuse the mens rea requirement,146 resulting in an ambiguous 
formulation of instructions designed at their discretion.147  With 
these factors in mind, it is perhaps unsurprising that courts’ 
individualized instructions have done little to remedy the 
complexity problem.148 
Some courts have attempted to add clarity to jury instructions 
on willful blindness.  One such example, upheld by the Third 
Circuit in 2006 in United States v. Oppong, stated: 
[T]he element of knowledge may be satisfied by inferences 
from the proof that the defendant deliberately closed his 
eyes to what otherwise would have been obvious to him.  
 
143 See 8TH CIR. INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 138, at introductory note (“We 
recognize that the manner of instructing a jury varies widely among judges, but 
these models are offered as clear, brief and simple instructions calculated to 
maximize jury comprehension.”). 
144 See Mark D. Yochum, The Death of a Maxim: Ignorance of Law is No Excuse 
(Killed by Money, Guns and a Little Sex), 13 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENTARY 635, 665 
(1999) (citing imprecise drafting as a principal cause of the confusion over proper 
application of the willful blindness doctrine). 
145 See, e.g., 7TH CIR. INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 139, § 4.06 committee comment 
(listing numerous cases approving the model instruction). 
146 See Robin Charlow, Wilful Ignorance and Criminal Culpability, 70 TEX. L. 
REV. 1351, 1382–90 (1992) (discussing confusion over the willful blindness doctrine 
and stating that “most definitions of wilful ignorance delineate a mens rea that is 
the equivalent neither of knowledge nor recklessness”). 
147 See Marcus, supra note 137, at 2257 (discussing courts’ confused 
understandings of the concept of knowledge as contributing to problematic 
application of the “vague and misleading notion of conscious avoidance”). 
148 See, e.g., United States v. de los Santos, 163 F. App’x 132, 135 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(“A finding beyond a reasonable doubt of an intent of defendants to avoid 
knowledge or enlightenment would permit the jury to find knowledge.  Stated in 
another way, a person’s knowledge of a particular fact may be shown from a 
deliberate or intentional blindness to the existence of that fact.”); United States v. 
Ramsey, 785 F.2d 184, 191 (7th Cir. 1986)  (affirming fraud conviction, while 
proposing that future Seventh Circuit juries be instructed that “[a] finding beyond 
a reasonable doubt of a conscious purpose to avoid enlightenment would permit 
an inference of knowledge.”); United States v. Whittington, 26 F.3d 456, 461–62 
(4th Cir. 1994) (“If you find that the defendant or defendants did not learn about 
the true nature of an existing fact . . . deliberately . . . for the very purpose of being 
able to assert ignorance at a later time, then you may infer and find that he had 
the full equivalent of knowledge because one’s self-imposed ignorance cannot 
protect him from criminal liability.”). 
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In other words, you may find such knowledge established 
if you find that the defendant was aware of the high 
probability of the existence of a fact and failed to take action 
to determine whether or not it was true.  The defendant 
cannot be convicted for being stupid, negligent, or 
mistaken.  More is required . . . . In short, if the evidence 
shows that the defendant did not know, then he must be 
acquitted.  If the evidence indicates that he was very 
stupid . . . or ignorant, then he cannot be convicted.  But if 
the evidence shows that there was a high probability that 
the defendant himself knew something was amiss and that 
he acted with deliberate disregard for a high probability 
that illegal activity was occurring, then you may find that 
the defendant had guilty knowledge . . . .149 
Here, the court makes a commendable effort to craft a legally 
sufficient instruction in plainer language which is more accessible 
to a juror, while clearly spelling out the necessary mens rea 
distinctions.  While the instruction still maintains some complexity 
initially, it appears to make strong strides toward simplification in 
the end, thereby assisting the factfinder in understanding the issue. 
Critics may argue, however, that countervailing problems are 
implicated by oversimplification; plainer language in a willful 
blindness instruction may obscure subtle distinction at the expense 
of general comprehensibility.  For example, the Oppong 
instruction’s sentence regarding the defendant’s failure to take 
action may undesirably blur the distinction between acts and 
omissions.  Similarly, some may argue that the instruction 
implicitly dilutes the knowledge requirement, holding the 
defendant liable simply for knowing “something was amiss” rather 
than for deliberately avoiding inculpatory knowledge.150  While 
these criticisms are valid, the plain-language approach employed 
 
149 165 F. App’x 155, 162 n.5, 163 (3d Cir. 2006) (upholding drug trafficking 
conviction based on willful blindness theory where “the District Court properly 
focused on the defendants’ subjective awareness”). 
150 The appellant in Oppong argued this very point.  Nonetheless, the Third 
Circuit upheld the instruction, noting that it had previously upheld similar 
wording and related variations.  Id. (citing United States v. Titchell, 261 F.3d 348, 
351 (3d Cir. 2001) (wording the portion of instruction as “deliberate disregard of 
the truth”); United States v. Caminos, 770 F.2d 361, 366 (3d Cir. 1985) (wording 
the portion of instruction as “high probability that he knew something was 
amiss”)). 
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in the Oppong instruction is at least a small step forward in 
addressing the problem of comprehensibility. 
4.2. Court Criticisms and Suggested Reforms 
Some courts have resisted the trend of increased reliance on 
willful blindness instructions by questioning the doctrine or 
recommending reforms.  While some of these courts have done 
little more than acknowledge skepticism regarding the doctrine,151 
others have posited that logical inconsistencies in the theory and 
doctrine render it largely questionable.152 
Such arguments may prove instructive to a reexamination of 
the doctrine of willful blindness.  However, it is important to note 
that these criticisms do not necessarily imply that the concept of 
willful blindness is inherently flawed.  As this Comment argues, 
the need to provide a framework for liability for those who act 
deliberately to avoid culpable knowledge is real, but so too is the 
need to ensure that such a framework does not improperly ensnare 
those with lesser states of culpability. 
Other courts have suggested broader limitations on willful 
blindness instructions which may potentially improve the doctrine 
going forward.  Specifically, the Ninth Circuit in United States v. 
Heredia153 acknowledged the “vexing thicket of precedent” 
regarding willful blindness and sought to clarify its scope.154  As a 
 
151 United States v. Adams, 63 M.J. 223, 265–66 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (referring to 
the willful blindness doctrine as a “legal fiction”). 
152 See, e.g., United States v. Alston-Graves, 435 F.3d 331, 337, 337 n.1 (D.C. 
Cir. 2006) (“It makes obvious sense to say that a person cannot act ‘knowingly’ if 
she does not know what is going on. To add that such a person nevertheless acts 
‘knowingly’ if she intentionally does not know what is going on is something else 
again. . . .  [I]t is hard to see how ignorance, from whatever cause, can be 
knowledge.”); Douglas N. Husak & Craig A. Callender, Wilful Ignorance, 
Knowledge, and the “Equal Culpability” Thesis: A Study of the Deeper Significance of the 
Principle of Legality, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 29, 52 (1994) (“[I]t is hard to see how 
ignorance, from whatever cause, can be knowledge.  A particular explanation of 
why a defendant remains ignorant might justify treating him as though he had 
knowledge, but it cannot, through some mysterious alchemy, convert ignorance 
into knowledge.”); THIRD CIRCUIT MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, com. to 
instr. 5.06 (“Other circuits have recognized that the willful blindness instruction is 
problematic, because it seems inconsistent to say that awareness can be proved by 
evidence that the defendant avoided awareness . . . .”). 
153 United States v. Heredia, 483 F.3d 913 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). 
154 Id. at 919 (“Here, we recognize that many of our post-Jewell cases have 
created a vexing thicket of precedent that has been difficult for litigants to follow 
and for district courts—and ourselves—to apply with consistency.  But, rather 
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preliminary matter, the court stated that willful blindness 
instructions should be given only rarely, and at a judge’s discretion 
after a specific factual inquiry.155  The court then distinguished the 
propriety of a willful blindness instruction versus an instruction on 
the defendant’s actual knowledge, stating that a judge should only 
issue a willful blindness instruction where the jury has rejected the 
government’s claim of actual knowledge, or where they could 
rationally distinguish between actual knowledge and willful 
blindness.156  Additionally, the court stated that willful blindness 
instructions should only be used when the government presents 
evidence that: (1) the defendant had actual suspicion of 
involvement in a crime; and (2) the defendant deliberately avoided 
verifying such suspicions.157 
Curiously, however, the full Ninth Circuit appeared to 
minimize concerns raised by the previous panel decision regarding 
the risks of unjust convictions for negligence158 and overinclusive 
 
than overturn Jewell, we conclude that the better course is to clear away the 
underbrush that surrounds it.”). 
155 Id. at 924 n.16 (discussing precedent stating that willful blindness 
instructions should be given rarely, but specifying that such precedent does not 
create a separate substantive restriction on the doctrine). 
156 Id. at 922 (“When knowledge is at issue in a criminal case, the court must 
first determine whether the evidence of defendant’s mental state, if viewed in the 
light most favorable to the government, will support a finding of actual 
knowledge.  If so, the court must instruct the jury on this theory.  Actual 
knowledge, of course, is inconsistent with willful blindness.  The deliberate 
ignorance instruction only comes into play, therefore, if the jury rejects the 
government’s case as to actual knowledge.  In deciding whether to give a willful 
blindness instruction, in addition to an actual knowledge instruction, the district 
court must determine whether the jury could rationally find willful blindness 
even though it has rejected the government’s evidence of actual knowledge. If so, 
the court may also give a Jewell instruction.”). 
157 Id. at 919–20; accord United States v. Inv. Enters., Inc., 10 F.3d 263, 268 (5th 
Cir. 1993) (expounding substantially the same rule).  The full Ninth Circuit in 
Heredia overruled a third element suggested by the Circuit’s previous three-judge 
panel ruling which would have additionally required a showing that the 
defendant deliberately avoided acquiring inculpatory knowledge with the intent 
to avoid prosecution.  Heredia, 483 F.3d at 920–21; see also Ninth Circuit Holds That 
Motive Is Not an Element of Willful Blindness, supra note 106 (criticizing the en banc 
Ninth Circuit’s overruling of the motive prong). 
158 Compare Heredia, 483 F.3d at 923 (“We do not share the worry, expressed in 
some of our cases, that giving both an actual knowledge and a deliberate 
ignorance instruction is likely to confuse the jury.”) with United States v. Heredia, 
429 F.3d 820, 824 (9th Cir. 2005) (3-judge panel decision) (citing United States v. 
Alvarado, 838 F.2d 311, 314 (9th Cir. 1988)) (“The instruction should therefore be 
rarely given because of the risk that the jury will convict on a standard of 
negligence: that the defendant should have known the conduct was illegal.” 
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abuse.  The en banc Ninth Circuit specifically stated that, “[a] jury 
is presumed to follow the instructions given to it, and we see no 
reason to fear that juries will be less able to do so when trying to 
sort out a criminal defendant’s state of mind than any other 
issue.”159  A previous three-judge panel of the court was far less 
optimistic on the latter points, stating that “[t]he government may 
not request a [willful blindness] instruction to close the gaps in its 
case. . . .  If we were to permit the issuance of the [willful 
blindness] instruction absent specific evidence that the defendant 
ignored the truth in order to provide herself with a defense, the 
deliberate ignorance doctrine in this circuit would slide perilously 
close to negligence or even strict liability.”160 
The concerns raised by the Ninth Circuit above should be 
particularly instructive to a reexamination of the willful blindness 
doctrine in the current context.  Despite the en banc Ninth Circuit’s 
criticism, the risk of confusion between actual knowledge and 
willful blindness should be considered by judges before issuing a 
willful blindness instruction.  In addition, such instructions should 
contain a clear, plain-language distinction between deliberate, 
willful avoidance and mere negligence.  Such instructions should 
make absolutely clear that the former satisfies the knowledge 
requirement in willful blindness, whereas the latter cannot.  
Contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision, such concerns of 
mens rea confusion amongst jurors must be addressed and 
remedied if the doctrine is to maintain its proper purpose in 
convicting only those who acted willfully.  These concerns of 
overinclusiveness and excessive prosecutorial zeal are particularly 
acute in light of other substantive and procedural restrictions 
already acting on those accused of acts of international terrorism in 
the current U.S. prosecutorial scheme. 
 
(internal quotes omitted, emphasis in original)).  The full Ninth Circuit in Heredia 
did, however, amend the panel decision to clearly spell out the differences 
between the various culpable mental states.  483 F.3d at 917 (amending footnote in 
previous panel opinion to read: “As our cases have recognized, deliberate 
ignorance, otherwise known as willful blindness, is categorically different from 
negligence or recklessness.  A willfully blind defendant is one who took deliberate 
actions to avoid confirming suspicions of criminality.  A reckless defendant is one 
who merely knew of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his conduct was 
criminal; a negligent defendant is one who should have had similar suspicions 
but, in fact, did not.” (citations omitted)). 
159 Heredia, 483 F.3d at 923. 
160 429 F.3d at 825, 830. 
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5. SPECIFIC DANGERS OF THE WILLFUL BLINDNESS DOCTRINE IN 
THE WAR ON TERROR 
As one writer has argued, the September 11, 2001 terrorist 
attacks brought the dangers of terrorism into our collective 
consciousness, while simultaneously raising the countervailing 
danger of reacting to terrorism with corrosive or overinclusive 
policies.161  In light of the domestic and international criticism 
noted above, this Section argues that the U.S. government has 
underappreciated that danger in the prosecutorial scheme of the 
War on Terror.  With these concerns in mind, reexamination and 
restraint of the willful blindness doctrine would be a small step 
toward addressing the danger of such overreaching, and thus 
toward improving the procedural propriety of our legal system.  In 
short, this Section argues in part that because detainees’ procedural 
rights are largely abrogated through adjudicative mechanisms of 
the War on Terror, improper use of the willful blindness doctrine 
may serve to abrogate the mens rea requirements used to convict 
them as well.  Doing so unduly undermines the legitimacy of the 
legal process, and thus the perceived legitimacy of U.S. terror 
prosecutions and foreign policy.  As a result, this Section 
recommends both reexamination and more cautious application of 
the willful blindness doctrine as a small step toward reform, 
focusing on danger specific to (though not exclusive to) defendants 
in the War on Terror. 
This Section examines specific arguments for reexamining the 
willful blindness doctrine with regard to detainees.  These reasons 
include the dangers of overinclusive convictions, the limitations of 
knowledge and understanding by factfinders, the finality of 
execution as punishment, and the potential use of the doctrine in a 
coercive manner.  The Section concludes with a discussion of 
potential critical responses to these arguments. 
5.1. Overinclusiveness 
An unduly broad application of the willful blindness doctrine 
raises the real threat of overinclusive convictions.  Specifically, by 
 
161 BLAKESLEY, supra note 5, at 35 (“Since September 11, 2001, we in the United 
States, and elsewhere have been caused to face not only the dangers of expected 
terrorism against us, but we must also face dangers associated with possible 
implementation of reactive draconian criminal laws, procedures, and methods 
that risk eroding our values, our protections, and liberties.” (citations omitted)). 
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confusing or improperly lowering the mens rea required to convict 
a defendant, misconstrual of the willful blindness doctrine creates 
the risk that defendants may be convicted for offenses requiring 
knowledge, where they did not have the requisite knowledge as 
defined by law.  This, at the simplest level, could thus result in 
convictions of defendants for offenses they did not commit.  More 
largely, this could exacerbate the expansion of the willful blindness 
doctrine beyond the confines of offenses requiring willfulness. 
At worst, use of the doctrine as currently misconstrued risks 
penalizing terror defendants for mere association162 with 
blameworthy persons, and doing so at the same level as knowing 
or intentional participants.163  Guilt by association is insufficient to 
convict criminal defendants, including even for conspiracy 
charges.164  As a result, it would be plainly improper to use the 
willful blindness doctrine to convict defendants who did not 
possess the requisite knowledge.  Properly narrow construction of 
the doctrine is necessary to avoid that impropriety. 
More narrowly, as discussed above, failure to reform the 
current doctrine may result in the improper conflation of 
willfulness with negligence.165  Some judicial rhetoric indicates that 
 
162 See generally Danner & Martinez, supra note 50, at 79 (“[I]f not limited 
appropriately, [the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise liability has] the potential 
to lapse into forms of guilt by association, thereby undermining the legitimacy 
and the ultimate effectiveness of international criminal law.  Doctrinal reforms 
may help avoid this danger.”). 
163 See generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (defining and separating four 
levels of culpability for those who act purposely, knowingly, recklessly, or 
negligently). 
164 See United States v. Diaz, 864 F.2d 544, 551 (7th Cir. 1988) (“[M]ere 
association with conspirators or those involved in a criminal enterprise is 
insufficient to prove defendant’s participation or membership in a conspiracy.”); 
United States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706, 759 (7th Cir. 1988) (“‘[P]resence or a 
single act will suffice if the circumstances permit the inference that the presence or 
act was intended to advance the ends of the conspiracy.’” (quoting United States 
v. Mancillas, 580 F.2d 1301, 1308 (7th Cir. 1978))); see also FEDERAL CRIMINAL JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT, instr. 5.11(a) (1999) (disallowing 
convictions for mere presence at the scene of a crime or association with 
participants of a crime without a showing of knowledge that the crime was being 
committed). 
165 See generally Danner & Martinez, supra note 50, at 79 (“[W]e argue that 
certain forms of joint criminal enterprise and command responsibility that tolerate 
a reduced mens rea should not be used in cases involving specific intent crimes 
such as genocide and persecution.  With respect to command responsibility, we 
argue that something more than ordinary negligence should remain the 
touchstone for criminal liability.”) 
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such a risk may be dangerously unappreciated.166  This concern 
may be particularly relevant to prosecutors attempting to have 
lesser figures in the War on Terror strike deals in exchange for 
implicating more senior terrorist leaders.  Furthermore, even 
assuming that the innocent-coercion problem noted above is not 
implicated, and that the lesser figure is culpable, the problem of 
overinclusiveness remains, in that it risks ensnaring those who do 
not possess the requisite culpable knowledge.  In the end, this 
conflation could also lead to a greater exacerbation of the problem 
of an overinclusive willful blindness doctrine, by creating a 
slippery slope of expanding precedent.  This would create the 
obvious risk of an overinclusive doctrine which may punish the 
guilty few but at the cost of potentially ensnaring the innocent, a 
result that would be inconsistent with Constitutional guarantees of 
a presumption of innocence.167 
In the specific context of the War on Terror, failure to 
reexamine the willful blindness doctrine could thus result in an 
increase in the quantity of convictions without a corresponding 
increase in their qualitative legitimacy.  For example, it could result 
in a high rate of convictions for lower-level couriers and middle-
men for terrorists, rather than higher-level terrorist leaders and 
financiers.  While such convictions are of course extremely 
valuable in themselves,168 this result would be only loosely 
 
166 See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 694 (2006) (Thomas J., 
dissenting) (“[U]nlawful combatants, such as Hamdan, violate the law of war 
merely by joining an organization, such as al Qaeda, whose principal purpose is 
the killing [and] disabling . . . of peaceable citizens or soldiers.”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
167 See generally Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 25 (1942) (“Constitutional 
safeguards for the protection of all who are charged with offenses are not to be 
disregarded in order to inflict merited punishment on some who are guilty.”). 
168 See Amos Guiora, Using and Abusing the Financial Markets: Money 
Laundering as the Achilles’ Heel of Terrorism, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 59, 60 (2007) (“There 
may be hundreds of men and women willing to carry a bomb, but operationally 
eliminating one of them merely makes room for another.  However, only a small 
number of people act as financiers of such attacks.  Thus, while the use of military 
and law enforcement in counterterrorism operations achieves the “on-the-
ground” objectives of rooting out terrorists, legislators must take proactive steps 
to permanently close the loopholes easily used by unscrupulous investors.  Terror 
financiers are fewer and further between and thus have a far greater individual 
impact on terrorism themselves.  Therefore, eliminating a single terror financier 
will have a greater impact on preventing attacks than will merely eliminating a 
few bomb-carriers.  As such, the bull’s-eye of counterterrorism must be expanded 
to larger concentric circles that include not only the fighters, but also those 
providing material support.  This discussion does not argue for the killing of such 
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consistent with the stated goals of the War on Terror.169  However, 
if the doctrinal underpinnings of such convictions are not properly 
sound, such convictions risk exacerbating domestic and 
international perception of the U.S. terror prosecution scheme as 
unjustly theatrical.170 
5.2. Limitations of Knowledge and Understanding by Factfinders 
As previously alluded to, cultural differences between 
American factfinders (civilian or military) and foreign defendants 
may adversely impact understanding such defendants, and thus 
adversely impact their ability to accurately determine such 
defendants’ knowledge.  Many scholars have characterized the 
underpinnings of the War on Terror as ideological and cultural in 
nature.171  Furthermore, some have specifically noted the unique 
problems created by cultural and ideological differences between 
the United States and Middle Easterners in the context of the War 
on Terror, saying: “[Americans] certainly must understand our 
own tendency to demonize . . . those of other cultural backgrounds, 
religions, races, or views. . . .  We have already begun to demonize 
the Al Qaeda gang and the Taliban, especially those in 
detention . . . .”172 
 
financiers, but rather for an acknowledgment that these individuals must be 
pursued with the same intensity as the bomb-carriers themselves.”). 
169 See 2002 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 1, at 1 (“The U.S. 
national security strategy will be based on a distinctly American internationalism 
that reflects the union of our values and our national interests.  The aim of this 
strategy is to help make the world not just safer but better.  Our goals on the path 
to progress are clear: political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with 
other states, and respect for human dignity.”). 
170 See generally Public Citizen v. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 468 (1989) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (“When structure fails, liberty is always in peril.”); 
Danner & Martinez, supra note 50, at 97 (“[P]roceedings perceived as illegitimate 
are not likely to foster peace and reconciliation.”). 
171 See, e.g., Robert L. Phillips, The War Against Pluralism, in TERRORISM AND 
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 101, 110–11 (James B. Sterba ed., 2003) (“[I]t is important to 
hold before us constantly the fact that we are involved in a culture war.”); Louis P. 
Pojman, The Moral Response to Terrorism and Cosmopolitanism, in TERRORISM AND 
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 135, 138 (James B. Sterba ed., 2003) (characterizing the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks as “rooted in culture, namely a religious 
worldview and practice”). 
172 BLAKESLEY, supra note 5, at 234–35 (internal quotation marks omitted); see 
also Naji Abi-Hashem, Peace and War in the Middle East: A Psychopolitical and 
Sociocultural Perspective, in UNDERSTANDING TERRORISM, supra note 11, at 69, 80–85 
(discussing several causes of anti-American sentiment in the Arab Islamic world, 
including a perceived “Cultural and Moral Invasion”). 
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This tendency to classify foreign defendants as fundamentally 
different or “other” out of fear understandably may compromise 
U.S. factfinders’ ability to reason fairly and objectively regarding 
the defendant.173  On this issue, other scholars have identified 
difficulties posed by trying potential terror defendants with value 
systems radically different from typically Western values 
produced as a result of such a cultural divide.174  Similar difficulties 
exist in asking American factfinders to determine the boundaries of 
“reasonable inferences” to be drawn from the circumstances 
presented to them to establish a foreign defendant’s liability.175  
Factfinders may unintentionally conflate differences in values 
(specifically hostility toward America or Western values generally) 
with willful blindness of or complicity in terrorist plots, resulting 
in convictions for blameless defendants.  This potential problem is 
arguably even more pronounced in military commissions than in 
U.S. domestic courts due to the fact that the defendant is often 
represented by a member of the military that is prosecuting him.176  
This cultural obstacle must be taken into account when 
 
173 See BLAKESLEY, supra note 5, at 297 (“Sadly, many of us tend to distrust, 
denigrate, and discriminate against those whom we perceive as being different 
from us, especially if we are made to be afraid of them.”). 
174 See Pojman, supra note 172, at 139 (“It is hard to reason with religious 
fundamentalists, for they generally hold their faith or religious assumption to 
trump what we in the West call reason.  Reason, for them, always functions as a 
strategy within the ‘bounds of religion alone.’” (emphasis in original)); 
Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Toward a Multicultural Conception of Human Rights, in 
MORAL IMPERIALISM: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY 39, 47 (Berta Hernandez-Truyol ed., 
2002), available at http://www.ces.uc.pt/bss/documentos/toward_multicultural 
_conception_human_rights.pdf (“To understand a given culture from another . . . 
may thus prove to be very difficult, if not impossible.”); see generally Fareed 
Zakaria, Culture is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kwan Yew, 
http://www.fareedzakaria.com/articles/other/culture.html (1994) (stating of 
Singaporean Senior Minister Lee Kwan Yew: “Part of his interest in cultural 
differences is surely that they provide a coherent defense against what he sees as 
Western democratic imperialism.”). 
175 See De Sousa Santas, supra note 175, at 47 (arguing that the strong 
rhetorical “commonplaces” of a given culture “become highly vulnerable and 
problematic whenever ‘used’ in a different culture.”); see generally Ratzlaf v. 
United States, 510 U.S. 135, 149 n.19 (1994) (stating that a jury may determine 
defendant’s knowledge by “drawing reasonable inferences from the evidence of 
the defendant’s conduct.”). 
176 See generally MCA, supra note 33, § 948k(b) (providing qualification 
requirements for defense counsel, including requiring that any civilian counsel be 
“otherwise qualified to practice before the military commission pursuant to 
regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense.”). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss2/6
2008] WILLFUL BLINDNESS DOCTRINE 741 
 
reconsidering the scope and application of the willful blindness 
doctrine to those accused of acts of international terrorism. 
To clarify, this argument does not mean to imply that 
American factfinders necessarily cannot adequately evaluate the 
liability of a non-American defendant.  To the contrary, U.S. courts 
have demonstrated their ability to do so appropriately and 
effectively even in extraordinary terror cases, both before and after 
the September 11th attacks.  For example, in United States v. 
Salameh,177 the Second Circuit in New York City engaged in a 
reasoned and sophisticated review of an appeal by a key architect 
of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.  There, the court 
carefully weighed the defendant’s arguments, and ultimately 
remanded him for resentencing out of concern that, as a pro se 
litigant, he was arguably inadequately represented at the original 
sentencing hearing.178  Similarly, in a more recent case, United 
States v. Moayad,179 the Second Circuit remanded a conviction for 
conspiracy to support Al Qaeda ruling that certain evidentiary and 
procedural errors were committed by the lower court.  That ruling 
further required the case to be remanded to a different judge due 
to those procedural errors.180  Regardless of the outcome of these 
cases, they help demonstrate a level of procedural integrity and 
institutional legitimacy in the domestic court system that many 
have argued are lacking in military commissions.  The more 
diversified factfinders’ level of understanding, increased 
procedural safeguards for the accused, and the greater opportunity 
for cross-examination in domestic court trials leaves the process 
with a greater chance of reflecting those goals.  In the end then, 
these cases help to indicate that domestic courts may be 
appropriate and effective instruments for evaluating the liability of 
foreign defendants, even amidst local, highly publicized, 
catastrophic terror attacks.181 
 
177 152 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1998). 
178 Id. at 161. 
179 No. 05-4186-cr, 2008 WL 4443841 (2d Cir. Oct. 2, 2008); see also Benjaimin 
Weiser, Appeals Court Overturns Two Terror Convictions, Citing Errors by Judge, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 3, 2008, at B1 (describing the ruling). 
180 Weiser, supra note 180, at B1. (calling the reassignment “a highly unusual 
step”). 
181 See generally HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE, supra note 47, at 5 
(concluding that “contrary to the views of some critics, the [federal courts are] 
generally well-equipped to handle most terrorism cases”). 
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Rather than arguing broadly that American factfinders cannot 
understand terror defendants, this Comment argues more 
narrowly that the risks of convicting a defendant unjustly are 
significantly higher in such cases.  Specifically, the risk of a 
mistaken American factfinder inferring knowledge where there is 
merely culturally influenced hostility toward the prosecuting 
government by the defendant contributes to the need to ensure 
that procedural protections afforded to such defendants are robust.  
As a result, a reexamination and narrow construal of the willful 
blindness doctrine would be at least beneficial in minimizing that 
risk, and thus will constitute a step toward increased legitimization 
of the terror prosecution paradigm. 
5.3. The Finality of Execution as Punishment 
The fact that many terror convictions may result in the 
execution of the accused makes these concerns particularly 
poignant.  It is a long established legal principle that for capital 
offenses, courts are (and ought to be) even more concerned than 
usual with ensuring the procedural legitimacy of the trial process.  
This principle exists due to the inherent finality and inexorability 
of execution as punishment—the fact that “death is different.”182  
The failure of a court to employ such heightened procedural 
protections risks the potential execution of an unjustly convicted 
defendant.  However, the risks extend more broadly to the policy 
sphere as well.  For example, applying the death penalty to one 
convicted of acts of international terrorism after a trial where the 
defendant’s presumption of innocence was compromised by 
internal procedural erosions would likely be viewed as a 
fundamentally unjust result by the international community.183  
 
182 See, e.g., Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411 (1986) (“In capital 
proceedings generally, this Court has demanded that factfinding procedures 
aspire to a heightened standard of reliability.  This especial concern is a natural 
consequence of the knowledge that execution is the most irremediable and 
unfathomable of penalties; that death is different.” (citation omitted)). 
183 See POHLMAN, supra note 16, at 247 (“It was a near certainty that 
international public opinion would not accept the legitimacy of a death sentence 
for [convicted terror defendant Zacarias] Moussaoui if he was not permitted any 
personal access to witnesses who could provide exculpable testimony on his 
behalf.”); Glaberson, U.S. Said to Seek Execution for 6 in Sept. 11 Case, supra note 44, 
at A1 (“Some countries have been critical of the United States’ use of the death 
penalty in civilian cases, and a request for execution in the military commission 
system would import much of that criticism to the already heated debates about 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss2/6
2008] WILLFUL BLINDNESS DOCTRINE 743 
 
Thus, with such a grave penalty hanging over the defendant,184 the 
procedures followed to obtain a conviction must be held to the 
strictest standards of fairness to avoid the undesirable appearance 
of an unfairly vengeful adjudicative framework.  One step toward 
ensuring greater procedural integrity in such trials must be the 
proper construal and application of mens rea requirements to 
establish guilt, particularly one as potentially expansive as willful 
blindness. 
5.4. Threats of Coercion 
Misapplication of the use of willful blindness as a theory of 
knowledge could be used to prosecute and convict guilty lesser 
terrorist figures to inculpate larger terrorist figures.  At worst, the 
intentional misuse of the willful blindness doctrine (playing on the 
likelihood of juries to misunderstand it) could be used as a device 
by zealous prosecutors to threaten or coerce innocent detainees to 
inculpate others, regardless of the truth of that inculpation.  These 
kinds of coercion, even if theoretical, could be used by prosecutors 
to pressure defendants into either false guilty pleas or into falsely 
inculpating other figures to escape punishment.  Either falsified 
result is undesirable from a legal or policy standpoint. 
Intentional coercion is, of course, contrary to both U.S. 
domestic law185 and international law.186  Despite the United States’ 
 
the legitimacy of Guantánamo and the Bush administration’s legal approach 
there, some lawyers said.”). 
184 See generally POHLMAN, supra note 16, at 197 (quoting Judge Gregory in a 
June 3, 2003 CIPA proceeding regarding accused terrorist Zacarias Moussaoui as 
saying “[The] sword of Damocles is over . . . [his] head . . . .”). 
185 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 1589 (2006) (criminalizing obtaining “the labor or 
services of a person by threats of serious harm to, or physical restraint against, 
that person or another person; by means of any scheme, plan, or pattern intended 
to cause the person to believe that, if the person did not perform such labor or 
services, that person or another person would suffer serious harm or physical 
restraint; or by means of the abuse or threatened abuse of law or the legal 
process”); see also 18 U.S.C. §  872 (2006) (criminalizing extortion by officers or 
employees of the United States); see generally U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No 
person . . .shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, 
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”); 
U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been 
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel 
for his defence.”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce 
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oft-invoked assertion that the Geneva Conventions do not (or 
should not) apply to detainees,187 such coercion, if utilized, could 
violate the Conventions’ prohibition on the same.188  A 
reexamination of the willful blindness doctrine and its more 
carefully narrowed application would be a step toward combating 
such potential coercion operating on those accused of acts of 
international terrorism.  Such a reexamination would also thus 
serve the goals of improving the perceived legitimacy of the U.S. 
terror prosecution paradigm as a whole. 
5.5. Critical Responses 
Critics may argue that reform of willful blindness has little 
relevance to the War on Terror.  Such critics would argue that it is 
unclear that willful blindness plays a central role in terror trials in 
domestic courts or in military commissions, and that military 
commissions are so infrequently actually used as to render them 
less germane to the discussion.  Such critics may specifically point 
to the recent military commission ruling in United States v. Hamdan, 
in which Osama bin Laden’s former driver was convicted of 
supporting terrorism, but was acquitted of the more serious charge 
of conspiracy to commit terrorist attacks.189  Such critics thus may 
suggest that this Comment’s call for reform of the willful blindness 
 
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.”). 
186 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 
supra note 20, art. 99 (“No moral or physical coercion may be exerted on a 
prisoner of war in order to induce him to admit himself guilty of the act of which 
he is accused.”); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons 
in Time of War, supra note 20, art. 31 (“No physical or moral coercion shall be 
exercised against protected persons, in particular to obtain information from them 
or from third parties.”). 
187 See Cheney remarks, supra note 21 (describing Vice President Cheney’s 
contention that detainees are not “prisoners of war” and thus do not receive the 
same guarantees and safeguards). 
188 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 
supra note 20, art. 99 (“No moral or physical coercion may be exerted on a 
prisoner of war in order to induce him to admit himself guilty of the act of which 
he is accused.”); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons 
in Time of War, supra note 20, art. 31 (“No physical or moral coercion shall be 
exercised against protected persons, in particular to obtain information from them 
or from third parties.”). 
189 Jess Bravin, Bin Laden Ex-Driver is Convicted, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 2008, 
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121802824878616731.html. 
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doctrine is overblown, in light of the fact that both domestic courts 
and military commissions have demonstrated their ability to 
adjudicate such cases fairly, and properly attribute the appropriate 
degree of culpable knowledge to terror defendants. 
Regarding these criticisms, the argument presented in this 
Comment points to a widely critiqued problem of confusion and 
overbreadth in the willful blindness doctrine.  While it would be 
unrealistic to assume that this problem infects only cases dealing 
with non-terror related subjects, even if that were true, the problem 
would still reflect one that looms with special implications for 
terror defendants.  In addition, while military commissions have 
been infrequently used, the doctrinal problem at least runs the 
serious risk of infecting both the domestic court system and 
military commissions.  In short, the argument made in this 
Comment does not say that courts cannot reflect a clear willful 
blindness jurisprudence, but rather that the confusion and 
complexity that has infected that jurisprudence makes it 
unreasonably difficult for them to do so.  That complexity should 
be reduced with a clearer explication of the criteria and limitations 
of the doctrine going forward. 
Critics may also argue that strong policy reasons exist to apply 
the willful blindness doctrine liberally to terror defendants.  The 
principal argument for such critics would likely be that willful 
blindness is a proper legal doctrine, and limiting it would create a 
grave threat of terrorists closing their eyes to avoid liability in case 
of prosecution.  However, such views mistake the nature of the 
problem.  As this Comment has argued, the proper use of willful 
blindness doctrine would be an invaluable tool to effectively 
capture and convict those who deliberately avoid inculpatory 
knowledge.  Properly applied, the doctrine is effective in 
convicting those who act willfully, as it was intended to do.  
However, the critics’ argument fails to consider the problems 
caused by misuse of the willful blindness doctrine to punish those 
who do not act willfully.  As this Comment has argued, neither the 
goals of the War on Terror nor the foreign policy goals of the 
United States are served by the conviction of innocent defendants.  
To that end, a reexamination of the willful blindness doctrine is 
necessary to prevent the misuse of the doctrine to convict 
defendants who do not act with the requisite knowledge to satisfy 
the charges against them. 
Similarly, critics may argue more broadly on utilitarian 
grounds that, even if the willful blindness doctrine is improperly 
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applied, that the exigencies of the threats posed by international 
terrorism more than outweigh any comparatively academic 
concerns of procedural impropriety.  Such a view has been 
suggested indirectly by several governmental officials and judicial 
opinions.190  However, without addressing the claims of ongoing 
exigency or the severity of such an ongoing threat, there are strong 
grounds to disagree with the view that any such exigency justifies 
a procedural abrogation of the nature discussed above.  The 
deprioritization of the protections afforded by legal procedure is a 
disfavored response to exigent circumstances.  While examples of 
such erosions of procedural protections abound in American 
history,191 such reactionary measures have required a strict 
showing of necessity.192  Contrarily, where such necessity has not 
 
190 See, e.g., THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 20 (Sept. 2006), available at http://www.whitehouse 
.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf (“[W]e will continue to take all necessary 
measures to protect our national and economic security . . . .”); John Yoo & Eric 
Posner, Editorial, The Patriot Act Under Fire, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 2003, at A26 
(“[S]ome think that even a small restriction of civil liberties can never be justified.  
These people think that, as a mark of our commitment to freedom, courts should 
not allow the government to invade our civil liberties even during emergencies.  
The truth is the opposite. . . .  [F]ear provoked by emergency also can motivate 
government to react to new threats in creative ways. . . .  Errors may occur, but 
they happen during peacetime as well as during emergencies.”); see generally 
Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229, 2294 (2008) (Scalia J., dissenting) (arguing 
that “The game of bait-and-switch that today’s opinion plays upon the Nation’s 
Commander in Chief will make the war harder on us.  It will almost certainly 
cause more Americans to be killed. . . .  In the long term, then, the Court’s decision 
today accomplishes little, except perhaps to reduce the well-being of enemy 
combatants that the Court ostensibly seeks to protect.  In the short term, however, 
the decision is devastating.”). 
191 See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219–20 (1944) 
(upholding detention of American citizens of Japanese ancestry in light of a 
military claim of necessity). 
192 See, e.g., id. at 216 (“[A]ll legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a 
single racial group are immediately suspect.  That is not to say that all such 
restrictions are unconstitutional.  It is to say that courts must subject them to the 
most rigid scrutiny.  Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the existence 
of such restrictions . . . .”); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 139–40 (1866) (“Congress 
cannot direct the conduct of campaigns, nor can the President, or any commander 
under him, without the sanction of Congress, institute tribunals for the trial and 
punishment of offences, either of soldiers or civilians, unless in cases of a 
controlling necessity, which justifies what it compels, or at least insures acts of 
indemnity from the justice of the legislature.”); see also Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 
348, 369 (1980) (“[T]he concept of military necessity is seductively broad, and has 
a dangerous plasticity.  Because they invariably have the visage of overriding 
importance, there is always a temptation to invoke security ‘necessities’ to justify 
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been demonstrated, the deprioritization of legal procedure in favor 
of the erosion of civil liberties has been harshly denounced.193  In 
either event, such erosions are justifiable, if at all, only for the 
duration of the exigent circumstances.194  Finally, even where 
necessity was demonstrated in particular cases, later courts have 
sometimes condemned the erosions of civil liberties enacted under 
such claimed necessity as anachronistic.195  Similarly, here, it is 
difficult to conceive of valid arguments for justifying an adherence 
to and misapplication of the willful blindness doctrine in the name 
of exigency.  This is true particularly in the context of detainees, 
where flaws and limitations of the current doctrine render it an 
unduly blunt tool for achieving justice. 
Thus, in short, utilitarian arguments should not persuade us to 
rationalize the misuse and misapplication of legal doctrine at the 
expense of a defendants’ presumption of innocence.  Countless 
legal avenues exist to convict accused terrorists of existing crimes 
without resorting to an overbroad misusage of willful blindness to 
achieve the same result.  The current overbreadth of the willful 
blindness doctrine threatens the conviction of innocent defendants, 
potentially undermining the legitimacy of the United States’ legal 
process, and thus risks undermining the political standing of the 
 
an encroachment upon civil liberties.  For that reason, the military-security 
argument must be approached with a healthy skepticism . . . .”). 
193 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 612 (2006) (finding that the 
government failed to satisfy the “most basic precondition” of military necessity 
for permitting the use of trial by military commission). 
194 See id. at 636 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Where, as here, no emergency 
prevents consultation with Congress, judicial insistence upon that consultation 
does not weaken our Nation’s ability to deal with danger.  To the contrary, that 
insistence strengthens the Nation’s ability to determine—through democratic 
means—how best to do so.  The Constitution places its faith in those democratic 
means.  Our Court today simply does the same.”); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 
507, 552 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[A]n 
emergency power of necessity must at least be limited by the emergency . . . .”); 
Milligan, 71 U.S. at 127 (“As necessity creates the rule, so it limits its duration; for, 
if this government is continued after the courts are reinstated, it is a gross 
usurpation of power.”). 
195 Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1420 (N.D. Calif. 1984) 
(granting writ of coram nobis, stating: “Korematsu remains on the pages of our 
legal and political history.  As a legal precedent it is now recognized as having 
very limited application.  As historical precedent it stands as a constant caution 
that in times of war or declared military necessity our institutions must be vigilant 
in protecting constitutional guarantees.  It stands as a caution that in times of 
distress the shield of military necessity and national security must not be used to 
protect governmental actions from close scrutiny and accountability.”). 
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United States in the international community.  To correct that 
problem, reform of the willful blindness doctrine is both necessary 
and desirable to further the United States’ legitimate legal and 
policy goals. 
5.5.1. Regarding Practicality 
Critics may argue that a proposed reexamination of the willful 
blindness doctrine is overly idealistic, and unlikely to have 
practical effect in light of the many pressures facing prosecutors 
engaged in international terrorism trials.  Of course, such pressures 
are both real and numerous.  Critics will argue that prosecutors of 
alleged terrorists are likely to view their duty as one of protecting 
lives and protecting the health of the nation.196  As a result, 
prosecutors of that mindset are unlikely to view with favor a 
perceived limitation on their authority or discretion.  In addition, 
critics would argue that personal, financial, and political pressure 
to win may trump the interest to follow perceived limited 
procedural restraints. 
Despite these pressures however, several countervailing 
interests support a reexamination or limitation on the application 
of the willful blindness doctrine in the context of international 
terrorism trials.  Most importantly, prosecutors and governments 
are under legal and ethical duties to apply the law both zealously 
and properly.  While some may argue that the high-stakes nature 
of international terrorism trials may justify or necessitate a more 
zealous and expansive prosecutorial demeanor,197 such arguments 
should be resisted.  Rather, this Comment argues that the 
 
196 Many politicians encouraged such a view after the September 11th attacks, 
stressing the desire to use any means necessary to capture and prosecute alleged 
terrorists.  See Newsmax.com Wires, supra note 2 (quoting then Attorney General 
John Ashcroft: “Let the terrorists among us be warned . . . .  We will seek every 
prosecutorial advantage.  We will use all our weapons within the law and under 
the Constitution to protect life and enhance security for America.”).  Ironically, 
some framed such views in the language of willful blindness.  See Associated 
Press, President Urges Renewal of Patriot Act, USA TODAY, Apr. 17, 2004, available at 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2004-04-17-bush-terrorism_x.htm 
(quoting President Bush’s April 17, 2004 radio address as stating “To abandon the 
Patriot Act would deprive law enforcement and intelligence officers of needed 
tools in the war on terror, and demonstrate willful blindness to a continuing 
threat.”). 
197 See Yoo & Posner, supra note 191 (arguing in part that certain emergencies 
justify a curtailment of civil rights and a more aggressive prosecutorial scheme to 
combat such emergencies). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss2/6
2008] WILLFUL BLINDNESS DOCTRINE 749 
 
protections afforded by the law exist to provide a procedural 
framework by which proper prosecutions must occur, including 
those which occur under extreme circumstances.198  Adhering to 
such a procedural framework may reinforce the legitimacy of such 
prosecutions, a result that could resonate socially, politically, and 
ideologically in the United States and abroad.199 
6. CONCLUSION 
The willful blindness doctrine is a central point on which to 
focus the debate between advocates of the potentially competing 
values of civil rights and national security in the context of the War 
on Terror.  When properly construed and applied, the willful 
blindness doctrine is an invaluable tool for establishing the 
culpable knowledge and liability of a defendant, regardless of the 
context.  However, when improperly extended or applied, the 
willful blindness doctrine presents serious potential dangers of 
overinclusiveness, illegitimacy, and coercion, to name a few.  
Practical applications of the doctrine and its extensions have 
demonstrated these dangers in both domestic and international 
fora. 
These dangers take on particular significance in the context of 
the doctrine’s use against those accused of acts of international 
terrorism.  As such, it is important for courts and tribunals to 
reexamine both the wording of willful blindness instructions to 
 
198 See Doe v. Gonzales, 500 F. Supp. 2d 379, 415–16 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“It is the 
judiciary’s independent function to uphold the Constitution even if to do so may 
mean curtailing Congress’s efforts to confer greater freedom on the executive to 
investigate national security threats.”); see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 589 (1952) (“The Founders of this Nation entrusted the 
lawmaking power to the Congress alone in both good and bad times.”); see 
generally HCJ 5100/94 Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. State of Israel 
[1999] IsrSC 53(4) 817, reprinted in ISRAEL LAW REPORTS: 1998-1999 at 567, 605 (Sari 
Bashi ed., Nevo Press Ltd. 2004),  available at http://www.hamoked.org.il/ 
items/260_eng.pdf (“Although a democracy must often fight with one hand tied 
behind its back, it nonetheless has the upper hand.”).  But see Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 
723 (Thomas J., dissenting) (“[N]o governmental interest is more compelling than 
the security of the Nation . . . .” (internal quotations omitted)). 
199 See generally Rosemary Foot, Human Rights in Conflict, 48 SURVIVAL 109, 
115–21 (2006) (arguing in part that increases in transparency and accountability 
will improve the perceived legitimacy of the United States’ terror prosecution 
scheme, benefitting the United States politically, morally, and in terms of national 
security, concluding: “The exercise of power in the absence of legitimacy is 
extraordinarily wasteful of resources and unlikely to achieve desired outcomes in 
the long term.”). 
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factfinders, and to apply the doctrine properly, in order to 
reinforce the legitimacy of the legal process itself.  This kind of 
reexamination will serve multiple important interests, the most 
salient of which being enhancing the legitimacy of the means used 
and the ends pursued in the U.S.-led War on Terror.  Such 
improvements may also promote the improved political perception 
of the United States abroad, by demonstrating that prosecutions of 
those accused of international terrorism are guided (and restricted) 
by proper applications of established rules of law. 
Broadly speaking, prioritizing procedural fairness used in 
terror prosecutions in the War on Terror would benefit the United 
States in numerous ways.  Politically, it would reinforce the 
integrity of the U.S. legal system and terror prosecution paradigm, 
leading other nations to cooperate more readily in bringing 
terrorists to justice.  Ideologically, it would reestablish a convincing 
moral sense of leadership and noble purposes, leading other 
governments to support (or at least not oppose) the United States 
on some moral grounds.  Socially, it would refortify the public’s 
confidence in the U.S. legal system, leading the public to support 
both the War on Terror’s means and ends.  While reexamining the 
willful blindness doctrine of course could not accomplish all of 
these goals alone, doing so nonetheless would be a small but 
valuable step toward strengthening the procedural integrity of our 
legal system.  In doing so, this step forward would serve the 
interests of civil rights and national security, thus furthering both 
the goals of the War on Terror and a broader sense of justice. 
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